THE DRAGON'S FOOTPRINT: A STUDY OF HOW REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS RESPOND TO CHINESE INFLUENCE by Miller, Janine E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2021-03
THE DRAGON'S FOOTPRINT: A STUDY OF HOW
REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS RESPOND TO
CHINESE INFLUENCE
Miller, Janine E.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/67154
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.








THE DRAGON’S FOOTPRINT: A STUDY OF HOW 
REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS RESPOND TO CHINESE 
INFLUENCE 
by 
Janine E. Miller 
March 2021 
Thesis Advisor: Covell F. Meyskens 
Second Reader: Emily L. Meierding 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions 
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington, DC, 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 March 2021  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master’s thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
THE DRAGON’S FOOTPRINT: A STUDY OF HOW REGIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS RESPOND TO CHINESE INFLUENCE 
 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
  
 6. AUTHOR(S) Janine E. Miller 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)     
 This thesis examines how the African Union (AU) and the Association for Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) have responded to China’s attempts to enhance its regional influence in Africa and Southeast 
Asia. I conclude that the AU is a weak institution because it lacks financial resources and management 
capacity to enforce desired regional norms. The thesis also finds that because of these shortcomings, China 
exercises a greater degree of influence in the AU. Additionally, China has set up the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) to operate as a competing framework for the region. In contrast, I determined that 
ASEAN is a strong institution because it maintains centrality to regional issues and encourages Chinese 
adherence to regional norms and values. Overall, I find that China is most successful in gaining influence 
when its interests align with regional goals for economic prosperity and integration, such as free trade 
agreements. This study discovers that when China can amplify institutional disunity, it strengthens its 
position relative to the existing institutions’ positions. This thesis demonstrates that China is least successful 
in exerting influence over a regional institution when that institution has robust mechanisms to enforce 
regional norms. In addition, when institutional members view China as a regional threat, they are more 
willing to band together and speak out against unwanted Chinese aggression. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
China, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, African Union, AU, Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation, FOCAC, Southeast Asia, SEA, South China Sea, SCS, regional 
institutions, influence 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 103 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THE DRAGON’S FOOTPRINT: A STUDY OF HOW REGIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS RESPOND TO CHINESE INFLUENCE 
Janine E. Miller 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
BS, U.S. Naval Academy, 2010 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(EAST ASIA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
March 2021 
Approved by: Covell F. Meyskens 
 Advisor 
 Emily L. Meierding 
 Second Reader 
 Afshon P. Ostovar 
 Associate Chair for Research 
 Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines how the African Union (AU) and the Association for 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to China’s attempts to enhance its 
regional influence in Africa and Southeast Asia. I conclude that the AU is a weak 
institution because it lacks financial resources and management capacity to enforce 
desired regional norms. The thesis also finds that because of these shortcomings, China 
exercises a greater degree of influence in the AU. Additionally, China has set up the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to operate as a competing framework for 
the region. In contrast, I determined that ASEAN is a strong institution because it 
maintains centrality to regional issues and encourages Chinese adherence to regional 
norms and values. Overall, I find that China is most successful in gaining influence when 
its interests align with regional goals for economic prosperity and integration, such as 
free trade agreements. This study discovers that when China can amplify institutional 
disunity, it strengthens its position relative to the existing institutions’ positions. This 
thesis demonstrates that China is least successful in exerting influence over a regional 
institution when that institution has robust mechanisms to enforce regional norms. In 
addition, when institutional members view China as a regional threat, they are more 
willing to band together and speak out against unwanted Chinese aggression. 
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This thesis examines how the African Union (AU) and the Association for 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to China’s attempts to enhance its 
regional influence in Africa and Southeast Asia. I chose ASEAN and the AU for this study 
because they are the dominant regional institutions in Southeast Asia and Africa. 
Furthermore, both Southeast Asia’s and Africa’s responses to Chinese influence may have 
significant implications for U.S. foreign policy if China were able to carve out a sphere of 
influence. 
I designed this study around three potential hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
predicted that strong regional institutions would maintain regional normative values and 
partner with China to benefit the region. Signs of a strong institution included creating 
binding agreements or enforcing adherence to established institutional norms. The second 
hypothesis predicted that weak regional institutions enable China to leverage influence by 
taking advantage of member states’ disparate interests and exploiting existing cleavages. 
Signs of a weak institution included deep political or social divisions, financial difficulties, 
competing member state priorities, and domestic instability or corruption that impedes 
regional coordination. The third hypothesis predicted that perceived threats to regional 
interests cause members of regional institutions to band together against China, regardless 
of whether the regional institution is weak or strong. 
 To test these hypotheses, I first examined existing scholarship, financial reports, 
regional agreements, newspaper articles, and organizational self-assessments to determine 
the AU and ASEAN’s overall strength and the ability to uphold desired regional norms. 
Next, I investigated how the AU and ASEAN react to China’s influence by utilizing 
sources that describe specific interactions between the organizations and China. For the 
AU, these sources focused on China’s financial aid, infrastructure development, trade 
agreements, and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). For ASEAN, these 
sources concentrated on similar topics such as financial aid and trade agreements but also 
included regional security issues and ASEAN-led multilateral forums. Then, I evaluated if 
these strengths or weaknesses affect the AU’s or ASEAN’s ability to manage Chinese 
   
 
xii 
influence. To do this, I analyzed whether ASEAN and the AU are able to utilize 
institutional strengths to ensure Chinese-led initiatives conform to regional norms. 
Likewise, I evaluated if Chinese-led initiatives are able to exploit identified institutional 
weaknesses to pursue China’s interests. Finally, I explored if member states’ responses 
differed when they recognize China as a regional threat. 
This thesis concludes that the AU is a weak institution because its lacks financial 
resources and management capacity to enforce desired regional norms. The thesis also 
finds that, because of these shortcomings, China exercises a greater degree of influence in 
the AU. Additionally, China has set up FOCAC to operate as a competing framework for 
the region. In contrast, this thesis determined that ASEAN is a strong institution because it 
maintains centrality to regional issues and encourages Chinese adherence to regional norms 
and values. Overall, this thesis finds that China is most successful in gaining influence 
when its interests align with regional goals for economic prosperity and integration, such 
as free trade agreements. The thesis also observes that, when China can amplify 
institutional disunity, it strengthens its position relative to the existing institutions’. The 
thesis determined that China is least successful in exerting influence over a regional 
institution when that institution has robust mechanisms to enforce regional norms. In 
addition, when institutional members view China as a regional threat, they are more willing 
to band together and speak out against unwanted Chinese aggression. 
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In 2008, China surprised the world with a breathtaking opening ceremony during 
the Beijing Olympics. Furthermore, Chinese athletes won more gold medals than any other 
nation that year.1 To many, this was a visible demonstration of the world’s changing 
perspective on China and its growing influence.2 Today, China stands as the biggest energy 
consumer, the second-largest economy, and the world’s largest population.3 Foreign 
Affairs recently announced that China had “surpassed the United States in the number of 
diplomatic posts around the world.”4 Not only has China’s diplomatic network surged, but 
so has its presence in many important international institutions. In the last two decades, 
China has become an active partner of existing institutions such as the Association of 
Southeast Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union (AU). At breakneck speed, China has 
evolved from an isolated nation to one of global integration. Forty years ago, this would 
not have been thought possible.  
One can find exhaustive research about China’s economic growth and domestic 
success, but far less empirical research measuring China’s ability to convert these 
resources to international influence. My central research question is, how are regional 
institutions responding to China’s attempts to increase influence? I have chosen ASEAN 
and the AU for this study because they are the dominant regional institutions in Southeast 
Asia and Africa. Additionally, both of these regions may become strategic battlegrounds 
for U.S.-China competition if China is able to shape institutional norms and values 
                                                 
1 “2008 Summer Olympics Sports Medals,” ESPN, accessed May 7, 2020, 
http://www.espn.com/olympics/summer08/medals. 
2 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 37–60; Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means To Success In World 
Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009) 83–126; David L. Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial 
Power (Oxford ; Oxford University Press, 2013) 1–12; Jan Melissen, ed., The New Public Diplomacy: Soft 
Power in International Relations (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005), 
https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230554931, 88-103. 
3 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 156. 
4 Bonnie Bley, “The New Geography of Global Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs. April 16, 2020, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-11-27/new-geography-global-diplomacy. 
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successfully.5 For this study, I investigate three factors to determine how these regional 
institutions respond to China’s attempts to increase influence. The first factor will be the 
overall strength of the institution, which is the result of an evaluation of the structural 
strengths and weaknesses of ASEAN and the AU. The second factor evaluates the 
relationship between the institution’s overall strength and its response to Chinese influence. 
The third factor determines, regardless of overall institutional strength, whether regional 
actors’ perception of China as a threat increases their propensity to band together and resist 
Chinese influence. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
1. Why Do International Institutions Matter?  
Institutions facilitate routine meetings and summits that provide a legitimate avenue 
for members to meet and discuss security issues, trade practices, or whatever functional 
activity the institution was created to address.6 Furthermore, international institutions are 
a diplomatic channel for countries to signal intentions with increased credibility as a 
member of that institution.7 Liberal institutionalists argue that institutions play a pivotal 
role in reducing conflict because they clarify intentions while giving other members equal 
opportunity to voice opposition. In other words, institutions foster cooperation and conflict 
resolution.8 Constructivists believe that participating in an institution has the potential to 
shift one’s perspective and identity over time.9 This shift in identity is reinforced by the 
positive benefits of collaboration within institutions and members’ cooperative behavior.  
                                                 
5 Nadege Rolland, China’s Vision for a New World Order, NBR Special Report 83, (Seattle, WA: The 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2020), https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-vision-for-a-new-
world-order/. 
6 Robert O. Keohane, “The Value of Institutions and the Costs of Flexibility,” in After Hegemony, 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1984),  244. 
7 Keohane, “The Value of Institutions and the Costs of Flexibility,” 244–246. 
8 Keohane, 247–251. 
9 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 
23 no. 1 (1998), https://doi.org/10.2307/2539267. 175–178. 
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Going against the accepted norms of these institutions would not only hurt the 
state’s reputation but could also result in economic or diplomatic isolation. We can 
perceive how institutions function to modulate China’s behavior through recent events. For 
example, China has tried to use military force or coercion to intimidate neighboring 
countries over disputed maritime borders in the South China Sea (SCS). Yet, China 
agreed to the Declaration on Conduct in the SCS in 2003 as a confidence-building measure 
for enhancing an ASEAN-plus-China relationship.10 This agreement is a poignant example 
of how institutions encouraged conflict resolution and harmony because China did not want 
to lose legitimacy or other benefits from ASEAN. In Sub-Saharan Africa, China has also 
faced some institutional constraints. For example, China’s commercial and military 
investments in Sudan have been criticized as propping-up a violent regime that committed 
multiple human rights violations.11 In this case, China lost diplomatic credibility because 
it deviated from standard practices promoted by the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which noticeably added to Sudan’s 
destabilization. Furthermore, China continues to face accusations of exploiting 
resource-rich African countries with aid programs requiring no oversight and no 
preconditions. Understanding China’s successes and difficulties in integrating with 
existing institutions may also illuminate the motivations behind new institutions China has 
initiated or supported. 
2. Understanding China’s Global Impact 
As a rising economic giant, China could have the capacity to challenge the 
established institutional norms set by the U.S. and Western countries. China’s current 
population and share of the global economy has the potential to give it a more significant 
voice in existing institutions such as the IMF and the UNSC. If China surpasses the U.S. 
                                                 
10 Sun, Xuefeng, “The Efficiency of China’s Multilateral Policies in East Asia (1997–2007),” 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 10, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 515–41, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcq011.  
11 Luke Patey, The New Kings of Crude: China, India, and the Global Struggle for Oil in Sudan and 
South Sudan (London: C. Hurst and Company Limited, 2014): 101–102, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=1920740.  
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as the world’s largest economy, the world would see a non-Western and a non-democratic 
country with the resources to revolutionize the future of world politics.12 Examining the 
methods and results of China’s influence campaigns in Southeast Asia (SEA) and African 
institutions are essential indicators for understanding China’s future attempts to reshape 
the global institutional order.  
Chinese investments have often been associated with corruption, environmental 
concerns, and sustainability questions. In some cases, the opaqueness of Asian 
Infrastructure Investment’s Bank (AIIB) practices has resulted in unfavorable outcomes in 
some countries’ economies and political institutions.13 For instance, as a result of Chinese 
financing deals, Sri Lanka has assumed substantial debt burdens, which some speculate has 
amounted to it losing sovereignty over national resources.14 On the other hand, the Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) offers unique opportunities that many countries 
find attractive. For example, many scholars have noted that the Asian financial crisis and 
the 2008 global financial crisis highlighted weaknesses in the Washington Consensus, 
centered on liberal political and economic norms.15  
Since China fared relatively better than states more integrated in the current 
institutional order, recent financial crises have given Chinese diplomats an opening to 
positively represent the FOCAC, and China’s model of economic development as a viable 
alternative for developing countries.16 To China, their alternative model is a win-win 
strategy that brings economic prosperity through increased trade and developmental aid 
                                                 
12 Kevin Rudd “Are China and the U.S. Doomed to Conflict?” April 1, 2015, TED, video, 2:50 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XQ1onjXJK0. 
13 David Shullman, “Protect the Party: China’s Growing Influence in the Developing World,” The 
Brookings Institution, January 22, 2019,. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/protect-the-party-chinas-
growing-influence-in-the-developing-world/. 
14  “Lessons from Sri Lanka on China’s ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy,’” ISS Africa, February 21, 2018, 
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lessons-from-sri-lanka-on-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy. 
15 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive.; G. John Ikenberry, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive,” 
Ethics & International Affairs; New York 32, no. 1 (2018): 17–29, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0892679418000072. 
16 John Ikenberry and Darren J Lim, “China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft,” The Brookings 
Institution,  April 2017, 7–11, https://www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-emerging-institutional-statecraft/ 
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without interference in the state’s sovereignty.17 Some believe China can use this influence 
to “remake the world.”18 This research is vital to understanding how China’s growing share 
of the global economy manifests as an influential power in world politics. 
3. Great Power Competition 
Currently, prevailing global norms are fundamentally rooted in Western ideals of 
liberalism, democratic pluralism, and human rights.19 As China rises in power, there are 
growing concerns that China seeks to reshape international institutions to serve its interests. 
What happens if China cannot effectively wield enough influence in regional institutions 
to satisfy its strategic interests? If the degree of China’s dissatisfaction outweighs the 
current benefits it receives from institutions, gaining influence through force or coercion is 
possibly the next logical step.20 As assuredly as China has grown in economic strength, 
so too has its military expenditure.21 China’s current military expenditures have gone 
from 1.6% in 1989 to rank the second highest in the world; the U.S. is the most.22 
                                                 
17 Olayiwola Abegunrin, China’s Power in Africa: A New Global Order., Politics and Development of 
Contemporary China Ser (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan U.S., 2019): 207–208, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-
030-21994-9.  
18 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 8. 
19 Nye, Soft Power, 32. 
20 Yves-Heng Lim, “How (Dis)Satisfied Is China? A Power Transition Theory Perspective,” Journal 
of Contemporary China 24, no. 92 (March 4, 2015): 280–97, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.932160.  
21 Ikenberry and Lim. “China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft,” 4. 
22 Sun, Xuefeng, “The Efficiency of China’s Multilateral Policies in East Asia (1997–2007),” 515–41; 
Peter E. Robertson and Adrian Sin, “Measuring Hard Power: China’s Economic Growth and Military 
Capacity,” Defence and Peace Economics 28, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 91–111, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2015.1033895. 
   
 
6 
Furthermore, many experts warn that the capability gap between China and the United 
States is shrinking.23 
Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has become markedly more assertive in 
pursuing its national interests.24 The consequence of this assertiveness is instability 
where U.S. and Chinese strategic interests clash.25 China’s rise and the fear of a 
declining U.S. evoke many references to the “Thucydides Trap.” In the past 500 years, 
there have been sixteen cases of a rising power displacing the current great power.26 
Twelve of those sixteen cases ended in catastrophic war, yet most never intended to 
go to war.27 The danger lies not only with the United States’ response to China’s rise 
but also in whether China sees the United States’ preeminence as constraining to 
China’s economic growth and global influence.28 This zero-sum competition has real 
ramifications for the future because it significantly contributes to the likelihood of a 
calamitous war. Given this considerable risk, it is vital to study all forms of China’s 
power and influence.  
                                                 
23 Benjamin Schreer, “China’s Development of a More Secure Nuclear Second-Strike Capability: 
Implications for Chinese Behavior and U.S. Extended Deterrence,” Asia Policy 19, no. 1 (February 4, 
2015): 14–20, https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2015.0010.; Oriana Skylar Mastro, “China’s Military 
Modernization Program,” American Enterprise Institute, September 4, 2019, 16.; Department of Defense: 
https://www.defense.gov, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
2019, Article, Homeland Security Digital Library (United States. Department of Defense. Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, May 2, 2019), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=. 
24 Nick Bisley, “The South China Sea as Symptom of Asia’s Dynamic Security Order,” in US-China 
Competition and the South China Sea Disputes, ed. Huiyun Feng and Kai He, (New York, Routledge, 
2018), 103; James Landale, “China’s New Brand of Tough-Talking Diplomats,” BBC News, May 13, 2020, 
sec. China, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-52562549.  
25 Bisley, “The South China Sea as Symptom of Asia’s Dynamic Security Order,” 103. 
26 Graham Allison, “Destined for War: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides’s Trap?” 
The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-
china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/. 
27 Allison, “Destined for War: Can China and the United States Escape Thucydides’s Trap?” 
28 Bisley, “The South China Sea as Symptom of Asia’s Dynamic Security Order,” 103. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section presents existing literature on China’s attempts to increase its influence 
in regional institutions. This literature review begins by exploring what scholars have 
written about China’s current attempts to increase influence in institutions. This section 
then reviews what scholars identify as obstacles to China’s attempt at exerting influence 
within international institutions.  
1. Chinese Influence on Existing Institutions 
In international relations, one of the most contested debates regarding the rise of 
China evaluates China’s use of economic resources and ability to shift power from a 
Western-led order to a Sinocentric order. These debates discuss the evidence (or the lack 
thereof) of China converting “soft power” resources into influential outcomes within 
institutions. Joseph Nye describes soft power as the ability to influence behaviors to 
achieve a certain desired outcome.29 According to Nye, soft power resources can be 
cultural, economic, or political. Furthermore, Nye claims that the preferences of a country 
can be strongly influenced by the policies a government champions in international 
institutions. Institutions enhance a country’s soft power when they promote a country’s 
culture and ideals as the dominant prevailing global norm.30 According to Goh, influence 
is the study of how one can use resources to affect policy outcomes.31 In this respect, 
soft power reduces the costs associated with the use of “sticks and carrots” to achieve 
policy outcomes.32 Meaning, institutions can be an extension of the state’s power to 
reinforce desired global norms to meet the state’s strategic objectives. 
                                                 
29 Nye, Soft Power, 5. 
30 Nye, 32. 
31 Evelyn Goh, Rising China’s Influence in Developing Asia (Oxford: University Press, 2016), 1–5. 
32 Nye, Soft Power, 5. 
   
 
8 
Many scholars have claimed that a rising China will inevitably influence the 
international system.33 However, the level of influence China can exert on institutions is 
intensely debated. For instance, David Shambaugh’s 2007 study came to the surprising 
conclusion that China lacks true global power because it is not yet shaping events to 
accomplish desired outcomes. For example, ASEAN member states benefit from the 
existing regional institutions and share a common interest in maintaining the status 
quo. ASEAN member states have been willing to support Chinese initiatives when they 
are seen as reinforcing multilateral cooperation or facilitating regional objectives.34  
Yet, other scholars claim that China’s growing economic resources have already 
allowed it to reward desired behaviors.35 China’s material and economic incentives appeal 
to states with financial difficulties. Furthermore, financing without preconditions or 
immediate political demands appeals to states with concerns about regime legitimacy. 
Chinese and African interests align because African leaders need strategic partnerships to 
bolster regime stability while China needs access to Africa’s markets and natural 
resources.36 Alden notes that China recognizes African states in the aggregate offer a 
significant voting bloc benefit for China. In this case, Chinese influence has been 
successfully converted to voting alignment on issues such as blocking UN Human Rights 
issues and China’s bid to host the 2008 Olympics.37 Bartholomew supports this scholarship 
in her testimony on the China’s Strategic Aims in Africa. In this testimony, she describes 
                                                 
33 John J. Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105. no 690, (April 2006): 160–
162 https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2006.105.690.160.; Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive. 
34 Sun, “The Efficiency of China’s Multilateral Policies in East Asia” (1997–2007): 515–41 
35 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive. 42.; Lindsey Maizland, “Is China Undermining Human Rights at the 
United Nations?,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed May 5, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/china-
undermining-human-rights-united-nations; Rana Siu Inboden and Titus C. Chen, “China’s Response to 
International Normative Pressure: The Case of Human Rights,” The International Spectator 47, no. 2 (June 
1, 2012): 45–57, https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2012.683277.; Bisley, “The South China Sea as 
Symptom of Asia’s Dynamic Security Order,” 104–112. 
36 Chris Alden, “China in Africa,” Survival 47, no. 3 (October 1, 2005): 147–64, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330500248086. 
37 Alden, “China in Africa,” 153. 
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how China uses its influence in Africa to isolate Taiwan and garner support for China’s 
territorial claims in the SCS.38  
Another strand of scholarship contends that China can work within existing 
institutions to indirectly increase its influence on other Chinese-led initiatives. For 
instance, China’s increasing participation in UN peacekeeping operations has bolstered 
both China’s global and regional influence in the AU. The peacekeeping operations 
reinforce the image of China as a responsible stakeholder. As a result, African leaders 
mutually benefit from the peacekeeping operations and China’s increased international 
prestige.39 Additionally, Chinese-led institutions can increase China’s ability to pressure 
existing institutions for more favorable rules. Ikenberry and Lim note that “The AIIB can 
potentially increase China’s influence and authority via at least two distinct pathways. The 
first is through leverage obtained from the threat of ‘exit’: offering an alternative to the 
existing Bretton Woods system of multilateral development lending.”40 In a weak regional 
institution, this pressure from alternative institutions may divide member states’ 
commitments to upholding the regional norms. 
2. Institutional Constraints on Chinese Influence 
Other scholars conclude that China’s pursuit of favorable institutional policies 
continues to be shaped by the structural constraints of existing institutions.41 In Southeast 
Asia, ASEAN is seen as the dominant organization governing regional institutional norms 
and strategic responses to challenges within the region.42 Andrew Yeo uses the historical 
institutionalism framework to link legacy ties of Asian states to the U.S. hub and spokes 
                                                 
38 Yun Sun, “Chinese Campaigns for Political Influence in Africa,” before the US-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission, Stimson Center, May 13, 2020, https://www.stimson.org/2020/chinese-
campaigns-for-political-influence-in-africa/. 
39 Philippe D. Rogers, “China and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa,” Naval War 
College Review; Washington 60, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 73–93. 
40 Ikenberry and Lim, “China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft,” 11. 
41 Xuefeng Sun, “The Efficiency of China’s Multilateral Policies in East Asia (1997–2007),” 515–41. 
42 Alice D. Ba, “Asia’s Regional Security Institutions,” The Oxford Handbook of the International 
Relations of Asia, October 1, 2014, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199916245.013.0034. 
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system. Yeo claims that states compete for influence by creating new institutions or 
promoting support for existing institutions that reinforce the state’s interests.43 Yeo 
concludes that despite the emergence of new institutions such as the AIIB and Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the foundations of SEA’s regional 
architecture will remain largely unchanged because of entrenched norms and institutional 
momentum. Instead, he claims that these new institutions have a “layering” effect driven 
by ASEAN multilateralism.  
Joseph Nye and Wang Jisi predict that it would be counterproductive for China to 
openly seek to manipulate international institutions to exclude the U.S.. In SEA, this has 
proved to be somewhat true. However, there is evidence that China is openly challenging 
the U.S.-led or U.S.-supported institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa with less blowback.44 
Why is there a difference between regional responses? Injoo Sohn observes that post-
colonial fragmentation has caused African states to lack a “collective bargaining policy to 
engage China.” This structural weakness has encouraged bilateral engagement with China 
in addition to FOCAC multilateralism.45 Chris Alden also notes that the decline of Western 
aid and development caused African leaders to seek out new sources to fill the void. This 
political and economic vacuum gave an opening for Chinese diplomacy. According to 
some scholars, FOCAC has become a model for China’s multilateral diplomacy in the 
developing world.46  
Additionally, payment for institutional membership often requires compromise. 
John Ikenberry and Darren Lim argue that “attempts by China to enshrine new rules, 
practices, or norms will require the cooperation of other states and thus compromise from 
                                                 
43 Andrew Yeo, Asia’s Regional Architecture: Alliances and Institutions in the Pacific Century, 
Studies in Asian Security (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2019): 10. 
44 Joseph S. Nye and Wang Jisi, “Hard Decisions on Soft Power: Opportunities and Difficulties for 
Chinese Soft Power,” Harvard International Review 31, no. 2 (2009): 18–22.  
45 Injoo Sohn, “After Renaissance: China’s Multilateral Offensive in the Developing World,” 
European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 77–101, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066110392083.  
46 Sohn, “After Renaissance: China’s Multilateral Offensive in the Developing World,” 80–81; Yun 
Sun, “Chinese Campaigns for Political Influence in Africa.”  
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Beijing.”47 In some cases, Ikenberry and Lim observe that China has conformed to 
dominant international norms to gain international recognition and legitimacy. Haggard 
also notes that “economic integration has a restraining effect on the foreign policy behavior 
of states.”48 His logic is that China’s reliance on foreign markets for economic growth 
constrains the amount of coercive economic pressure it can use.49 For example, the United 
Nations Security Council’s threat to curtail energy supplies may have forced China to 
modify its non-intervention foreign policy and cooperate with the AU to support 
peacekeeping operations in Sudan.50 These authors have suggested that countries can use 
institutions to foster regional stability and improve economic growth. I will seek to build 
on existing scholarship and test if the strength of ASEAN and the AU impacts how these 
institutions handle Chinese influence.  
Perceived threats to regional interests may impact regional institutions’ response to 
Chinese influence campaigns. This vein of scholarship is based on the balance of power 
theory. The balance of power theory predicts if one state becomes too strong, weaker states 
will unite to balance against the threat.51 For example, when China’s policies are perceived 
as competing for governance or threatening strategic interests, member states may be likely 
to turn against China in protest.52 Shambaugh asserts China’s regional “muscle-flexing” 
and military modernization in SEA diminishes its reputation and regional influence among 
ASEAN member states. Many scholars have argued that the perception of China as a 
                                                 
47 Ikenberry and Lim, “China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft,” 3. 
48 Stephan Haggard, “The Liberal View of the International Relations of Asia,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of the International Relations of Asia, 2014: 16, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199916245.013.0003.  
49 Haggard, “The Liberal View of the International Relations of Asia,” 16. 
50 Alden, “China in Africa,” 160. 
51 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, 
no. 4 (1985): 3–43, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540. 
52 Kai He, “Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence 
and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 3 
(September 1, 2008): 489–518, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066108092310. 
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security threat has caused institutional balancing within the ASEAN framework.53 
Furthermore, most scholars agree that regional actors in SEA are reluctant to follow 
policies that force them to choose China over the U.S..54 Similarly, existing scholarship 
on SSA has indicated that there is some regional pushback due to economic concerns on 
growing indebtedness to China.55 More recently, there has been some anger from the AU 
and individual member states as a result of China’s position on granting debt relief during 
the pandemic and the ill-treatment of the African diaspora in mainland China.56 This study 
will seek to determine if member states rally around regional institutions, regardless of the 
overall institutional strength, when China is perceived as a threat to regional interests.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This section identifies three possible answers to the thesis’ research question, how 
are regional institutions responding to China’s attempts to increase influence? For this 
research, influence in institutions is defined as the ability “to set the agenda and make or 
change norms to constrain others.”57 
Hypothesis 1: Strong regional institutions are able to collectively ensure Chinese 
influence is handled on the region’s terms.  
                                                 
53 Pascal Abb and Georg Strüver, “Regional Linkages and Global Policy Alignment: The Case of 
China-Southeast Asia Relations,” Issues and Studies; Taipei 51, no. 4 (December 2015): 33–83; He, 
“Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory.”; Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security 
Community in Southeast Asia : ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (Routledge, 2009), 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203939239. 
54 Michael A. Glosny, “Heading toward a Win–Win Future? Recent Developments in China’s Policy 
toward Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 2, no. 1 (May 1, 2006): 24–57, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14799850600575199.; Sun, Xuefeng, “The Efficiency of China’s Multilateral 
Policies in East Asia (1997–2007).”; Roy Denny, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or 
Bandwagoning?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia; Singapore 27, no. 2 (August 2005): 305–22, 
http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1355/CS27-2G.; Joseph S. Nye and Wang Jisi, “Hard Decisions on 
Soft Power: Opportunities and Difficulties for Chinese Soft Power,” Harvard International Review 31, no. 
2 (2009): 18–22; Yun Sun, “Chinese Campaigns for Political Influence in Africa.” 
55 Yun Sun, “Chinese Campaigns for Political Influence in Africa.” 
56 Simon Marks, “Coronavirus Ends China’s Honeymoon in Africa,” Politico, April 16, 2020, 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/16/coronavirus-china-africa-191444. 
57 Goh, Rising China’s Influence in Developing Asia, 14. 
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A strong institution should exhibit the ability to enforce economic and political 
rules established by the institution. When faced with an initiative challenging regional 
norms, a strong institution should be able to effectively reinforce institutional values and 
prioritize regional interests over undesirable influences. A strong institution will thus 
constrain China’s ability to go against valued regional institutional norms by collectively 
pushing back against objectionable Chinese initiatives. 
ASEAN and the AU are the dominant institutions in their regions. Evidence shows 
that the ASEAN-Way has promoted inclusion and cooperation among member states.58 
ASEAN has supported the East Asian Summit (EAS), the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation, and other multilateral initiatives within the region. The AU was established 
as a mechanism to help realize Africa’s potential for economic growth and development 
while promoting unity within the region.59 If this hypothesis is true, I expect to see the 
institutions shaping Chinese influence by forcing China to adhere to regional norms 
through multilateralism based on these trends.  
Hypothesis 2: Weak regional institutions enable China to leverage influence by 
taking advantage of member states’ disparate interests and exploiting existing cleavages.  
Weak institutions would not have a cohesive institutional architecture and may have 
multiple cleavages that weaken the institution’s ability to establish or enforce regional 
norms. A weak institution would not have a history of achieving regional goals because of 
these cleavages. A weak institution would not be able to provide an effective platform for 
driving economic or political stability within the region. Existing scholarship shows that 
both ASEAN and the AU member states are politically, ethnically, and economically 
heterogeneous. Additionally, some member states have issues with corruption, 
underdeveloped economies, or domestic instability that causes competing priorities within 
the institution. If this hypothesis is true, I expect to see China successfully exploit these 
                                                 
58 Haggard, “The Liberal View of the International Relations of Asia,” 2–3. 
59 Innocent EW Chirisa, Artwell Mumba, and Simbarashe O. Dirwai, “A Review of the Evolution and 
Trajectory of the African Union as an Instrument of Regional Integration,” SpringerPlus 3, no. 1 (February 
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weaknesses to pursue its own strategic interests because the institution cannot overcome 
divisions to prioritize regional interests.  
Hypothesis 3: Perceived threats to regional interests cause members of regional 
institutions to band together against China, regardless of whether the regional institution 
is weak or strong. 
 
Existing scholarship demonstrates that some ASEAN member states have viewed 
China as a threat. Fears that China is “returning to power” instead of pursuing peaceful 
development may account for some obstacles to Chinese influence campaigns in ASEAN. 
Existing scholarship suggests these memories have led to increased security cooperation 
with Japan, the U.S., and other regional actors. On the other hand, Africa does not have the 
same tumultuous history and associated wariness of China’s rise, but it does have a history 
of division caused by colonialization.60 I expect that the AU is more willing to partner with 
China since it has no historical bias.  
D. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This study seeks to evaluate how regional institutions are responding to Chinese 
influence. I have chosen ASEAN and the AU because of their importance to their 
respective regions. Furthermore, I have chosen to investigate both Southeast Asia’s and 
Africa’s responses to Chinese influence because these regions have significant implications 
for U.S. foreign policy if China were able to carve out a sphere of influence. Lastly, China’s 
reputation has been relatively steady in these regions, despite declining in other areas of 
the world.61  
This thesis will examine ASEAN’s and the AU’s response to China’s influence in 
four chapters. Chapter I explained the research question and why it is significant for 
understanding China’s global impact. Additionally, Chapter I provided a review of the 
                                                 
60 His Excellency Paul Kagame, “Unleashing Africa’s Inner Strengths,” January 11, 2018, The 
Brookings Institution https://www.brookings.edu/research/unleashing-africas-inner-strengths/. 
61 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 10. 
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existing literature on this topic, explained what my main hypotheses are going forward, 
and how I will evaluate them. Chapter II focuses on ASEAN. This chapter examines the 
strengths and weaknesses of ASEAN as a regional institution. The second half of the 
chapter then evaluates if these strengths or weaknesses affect ASEAN’s ability to manage 
Chinese influence. This chapter also considers if member states balance against China 
when ASEAN views China as a security concern, regardless of ASEAN’s overall strength. 
Chapter III conducts the same analysis as Chapter II but focuses on the AU. Chapter IV 
summarizes my findings and present likely future trends. 
To test whether either ASEAN or the AU constrain China’s influence, I determine 
the strength of the institutions. For this assessment, I establish how these institutions 
function to determine their strengths and weaknesses. First, I examine ASEAN and the 
AU’s history to determine how these institutions function. Specifically, I investigate the 
established institutional values and regional agreements. This analysis establishes a 
baseline for determining the overall strength of the institution. Signs of a strong institution 
would include the ability to create binding agreements or enforce adherence to established 
institutional norms. A weak institution’s signs would include deep political or social 
divisions, financial difficulties, competing member state priorities, or domestic instability 
or corruption that impedes regional coordination. I then examine if the institution’s overall 
strength affects how Chinese-led initiatives are addressed. For this analysis, I examine 
whether ASEAN and the AU are able to utilize institutional strengths to ensure Chinese-
led initiatives conform to regional norms. I equally examine if Chinese-led initiatives are 
able to exploit identified institutional weaknesses to pursue China’s interests. I also explore 
if when member states recognize China as a regional threat, they collectively balance 
against the threat, irrespective of overall institutional strength.  
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II. AFRICAN UNION 
In 2012, the African Union (AU) unveiled its new headquarters. Worth 
$200 million, the AU headquarters was entirely funded, designed, and built by China.62 To 
China, the African Union Conference was a grand gesture of its support for African 
integration and desire to strengthen pragmatic cooperation.63 For some, the conference 
building represents a visible and symbolic milestone in Sino-African relations. However, 
to others, this image was marred by controversy amid reports that China bugged the entire 
building and spied on African leaders over the course of five years.64 According to the 
explosive report by Le Monde, the AU leadership kept the knowledge of the Chinese 
surveillance secret for over a year after its discovery.65 This secrecy demonstrates China’s 
growing strategic significance to African leaders, but the optics also suggests an 
asymmetrical relationship. China’s increasing involvement in Africa has been the topic of 
substantial media and scholarly attention since the early 2000s; yet, specific research into 
its exact relationship with the AU has been decidedly absent. This chapter aims to assess 
the AU’s reception and response to Chinese efforts within the region to address a gap in 
China-Africa literature on the effectiveness of Chinese influence in the AU.  
Unlike other regional institutions, the AU is newer, less established, and under-
resourced. The AU’s difficulties in achieving its core objectives have influenced its 
decisions to willingly receive vast funding and resources from China for infrastructure 
development, economic growth, and peacekeeping efforts. China’s political and financial 
                                                 
62 Yara Bayoumy, “Glitzy New AU Headquarters a Symbol of China-Africa Ties,” Reuters, January 
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support for the AU’s flagship projects allows the AU to accomplish key goals that help 
elevate its image, but simultaneously drives perceptions that the AU is losing control over 
its agenda through growing dependence on China. The existence of FOCAC (the Forum 
on China–Africa Cooperation), as a competing and more established regional institution, 
undermines the AU’s ability to act as the preeminent recognized voice for the region. 
China’s formidable resources entice AU member states to pursue bilateral arrangements, 
which limits the AU’s ability to act as the representative voice of a unified Africa. 
Furthermore, the AU’s participation in FOCAC, as a member, associates it with decisions 
that may compromise its organizational desires for democratic principles in the region.  
A. AFRICAN UNION AND INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES 
The AU’s shortcomings have influenced its decisions to seek resources and funding 
from China to maintain relevance and legitimacy as a regional institution. The AU’s core 
objectives are to promote inclusive, sustainable development, economic prosperity, and 
mobilize continental integration based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism driven by its own 
citizens.66 The AU was formally established as the premier Pan-African institution on 9 
July 2002.67 Currently, the AU consists of representatives from all countries on the 
continent for a total of 55 African member states. Structurally, the AU is divided into five 
geographic regions: Central Africa, Eastern Africa, Northern Africa, Southern African, and 
Western Africa. The AU replaced the former regional institution, the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), during a surge of Pan-African optimism for the future development 
of a unified Africa. Created as a response to globalization and the changing post-Cold War 
environment, the AU was intended to strengthen economic unity between African countries 
and promote stability, peace, and security throughout the continent.68 Over the last two 
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decades, the AU has sought to establish regional norms for economic integration, good 
governance, social justice, good health, democratic principles, poverty reduction, gender  
equality, and solidarity in its approach to African security and developmental challenges.69 
Previously, the OAU’s efforts to promote solidarity and prosperity among African 
member states were hampered by member states’ desires to safeguard state sovereignty 
with policies of non-interference, which led to inaction by the organization.70 In 
comparison, the AU was given greater powers of intervention in member state’s affairs and 
stronger administrative mechanisms, but some measures remain ineffective or under-
resourced.71 For example, although the Constitutive Act of the AU (the primary framework 
for the AU’s regional norms and rules) reaffirms non-intervention and domestic 
sovereignty principles from member states, it does not prevent the AU as an organization 
from intervention when “concerned with peace, security, and stability in the region.” 72 
However, intervention requires a consensus decision by AU’s Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government, which increases the risk of inaction because some member states fear 
organizational over-reach or disagree on acceptable conditions for intervention.73 
Additionally, the Constitutive Act gives the AU power to take action against 
unconstitutional changes of governments in African member states by “enabling it to 
prohibit essentially illegitimate governments from participating in further [AU] activities,” 
yet it has rarely been exercised.74 Many scholars have noted that the AU continues to 
struggle to promote unity and solidarity with African member states because it lacks the 
manpower and resources to  
                                                 
69 Mark Paterson and Abebajo Adekeye, “The African Union at Ten: Aspirations and Reality,” CCR 
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enforce rules and national sovereignty remains a divisive issue.75  
This entrenched norm of non-interference, formed initially due to the collective 
memory of colonizers’ historical exploitation, has become an institutionalized vehicle for 
African governments to pursue regime security over improving welfare and security for 
their citizens.76 This is a major source of friction within the AU because member states 
remain divided on when, if ever, interference is justified. Consequently, the lack of a 
unified African voice leaves room for corruption, political instability, and predatory 
practices by both domestic and foreign actors.77 Additionally, these deficiencies leave 
Africa without a collective voice on the global stage. In an effort to continue to address 
these shortcomings, the AU voted to transform a formerly ineffectual arm of the AU, New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The reforms strengthened the NEPAD’s 
capacity to improve the impact and efficiency of the AU’s initiatives of democracy and 
political governance, regional integration, and human rights.78 Now, the NEPAD 
spearheads the resource mobilization and implementation of the 15 flagship projects 
identified in the AU’s Agenda 2063. 
While the Constitutive Act of the AU and the NEPAD lay out ambitious 
frameworks for integration and growth on the African continent, neither explicitly defines 
a means for financing the AU.79 African member states and foreign donors are the two 
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main sources of funding for the AU.80 Yet, lack of enforcement, competing member state 
interests, and overlapping regional organizations divide member state contributions.81 As 
a result, a majority of member states fail to pay their annual dues.82 Consequently, external 
donors disproportionately contribute to the AU’s budget.83 According to the 2015 AU 
financial statement, 61.7% of the financing came from outside donors.84 Notably, China 
has been identified as the third top contributor to the overall AUC budget, following the 
EU and World Bank.85 Because of the large number of outside donors, the AU’s financial 
woes have led to questions of institutional effectiveness and autonomy.86 In 2017, Paul 
Kagame, the President of Rwanda and later Chair of the AU, proposed a series of reforms 
to reduce the AU’s dependency on outside donors and realign institutional priorities.87 
According to the AU Assembly report, the proposed reforms recommended a legally 
binding mechanism for ensuring member states implement reforms with fines for 
delinquents. As of 2019, donors still contributed 59% of the AU’s total budget. The 
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percentage has decreased slightly but remains a significant contribution to the AU’s 
budget.88  
The AU’s financial woes continue to demonstrate the institution’s inability to 
enforce adherence to financial commitments. For example, the African Union Peace Fund 
has continually fallen short of budgetary goals due to low member state contribution.89 
This is significant because the African Union’s Peace Fund was intended to be the principal 
tool for funding all peace and security operations on the continent, which are foundational 
to the AU’s core objectives. More recently, talks between the UN Security Council and 
AU for using UN financing for the AU peace support operations stalled, demonstrating 
another instance of the AU’s financial troubles.90 As a result of failed negotiations and 
fewer member state contributions, the AU announced a delay in funding security operations 
from a new fund until 2023.91 These are significant challenges because the lack of financial 
resources impacts the AU’s credibility as a genuine actor in Africa. Moreover, failed 
negotiations highlight the AU’s inability to establish or execute its agenda because it 
continues to heavily rely on external funding.92 Many AU initiatives, such as the Peace 
Fund, have been delayed or floundered because of the lack of resources for 
implementation.93  
The unreliability of AU member state contributions and competing state interests 
has led to staffing challenges and wider management issues that affect the AU’s ability to 
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enforce adherence to desired regional norms. Additionally, varying degrees of economic 
development and diversity among AU member states make it difficult for the AU to reach 
a consensus on a consolidated approach for the continent. Without resources, the AU lacks 
the necessary “sticks and carrots” that could be leveraged to resolve internal conflicts.94 
Furthermore, high levels of donor support have led to mission creep, weakening African 
ownership for critical AU objectives.95 Until the AU can finance itself, it cannot reliably 
plan for long-term budgets, nor can it achieve its goal for African driven development if 
its agenda is influenced by outside donors.96 Subsequently, AU member states are 
increasingly looking to secure outwardly financed infrastructure projects and capacity 
training programs to spur individual economic growth.97  
B. CHINA AND THE AU: A CONVERGENCE OF INTERESTS 
China’s political and financial support for the AU’s flagship projects allows the AU 
to accomplish key goals that can help elevate its image, but simultaneously drives 
perceptions that the AU is losing control over its agenda through growing dependence on 
China. At the 2011 AU Peace and Security Council, African leaders recognized that the 
lack of significant improvements in economic development and political governance had 
caused persistent crises and conflicts on the continent.98 Lack of capacity and resources 
remain obstacles for the AU’s ambitions regarding these challenges. These challenges 
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affect how China operates within AU member states. Currently, there are approximately 
one million Chinese citizens living and working in Africa.99 Since China’s interests have 
exponentially grown on the continent, protecting Chinese nationals and commercial assets 
has become a higher priority. Incidents like the evacuations of Chinese citizens in South 
Sudan, Libya, and Yemen, highlight the growing interconnectedness for Chinese 
companies and the need for peace and security in Africa.100 Accordingly, China and the 
AU’s interests for a safe, stable, and prosperous African continent intersect.  
As a permanent member of the UN security council and the second-largest donor 
contributor to the peacekeeping budget, China has primarily worked with the AU Peace 
and Security Council for peacekeeping efforts.101 Presently, China provides more 
peacekeeping personnel to Africa than any other permanent member of the UNSC.102 
Although fewer overall troops than top contributors, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Bangladesh, India, 
Nepal, and Pakistan, the significant contribution is not lost on the AU and has been 
welcomed by AU member states.103 Additionally, China routinely insists that the UNSC 
should engage with the AU’s peace and security efforts, reiterating support for “Solving 
African Problems by Africans.”104 For example, experts note China’s constructive role in 
changing the Sudanese government’s initial rejection of UN-AU peacekeeping missions to 
consent for a deployment of UN-AU peacekeeping troops in Darfur and acceptance of the 
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second phase of the Annan Plan.105 These direct engagements with the AU for attaining 
peace and security on the continent has elevated its status as a regional organization.106 
For China, raising the AU’s profile at forums such as the UNSC is a win-win strategy 
because it elevates its image as a representative for developing countries while giving a 
greater voice to those that share similar opinions to China on major international topics 
such as human rights and sovereignty issues.107  
In the last decade, China has pledged to contribute logistically and financially to 
the AU’s peace and security programs almost every year. For example, China pledged $100 
million to strengthen the AU’s Peace and Security capacity for initiatives like the African 
Standby Force (ASF) and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) 
in 2015.108 In 2016, China donated $1.2 million to peacekeeping efforts in Somalia through 
the AU Mission in Somalia.109 Additionally, at the highly publicized 2018 FOCAC, 
President Xi announced a new China-Africa Peace and Security Fund, including 50 
security assistance programs connected with the BRI.110 In return, over a dozen African 
countries, including Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, have reciprocated political support 
for China at the UN Human Rights Council on recent issues regarding China’s Xinjiang 
policies.111 Since the AU’s Peace and Security programs have historically dealt with 
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funding and capacity issues, China’s engagement is a boon for accomplishing regional 
goals for stability. On the other hand, member state support for China’s Xinjiang policies 
contradicts the AU’s commitment to improving and protecting human rights. 
As Africa’s largest trading partner, China has also positioned itself as a strategic 
partner for AU member states and the AU’s flagship economic initiatives.112 According to 
Devonshire-Ellis, China used its economic and diplomatic clout to galvanize support for 
regional economic integration as a major broker in actualizing the AU’s landmark African 
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA) agreement.113 The AfCTA was launched at the 
2019 Extraordinary Summit of the African Union as one of the flagship projects identified 
by the AU’s Agenda 2063 and has since reached the operational phase of 
implementation.114 Surpassing the size of the WTO, the AfCTA is the world’s largest free 
trade agreement and is projected to increase trade among African countries from 15 percent 
to approximately 52 percent and lift 68 million people out of poverty.115 Additionally, the 
AfCTA will boost Africa’s capacity for manufacturing cheap goods, but in the short-term, 
some countries will likely suffer from the impact of increased competition with Chinese 
goods and loss of tariff revenue by removing tariff barriers.116 Despite potential 
drawbacks, 30 countries have ratified the AfCTA instruments and all AU member states, 
except Eritrea, have signed the agreement.117 This is a prime example of China’s ability to 
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capitalize on shared preferences among AU member states for economic growth by 
promoting regional integration, which deepens economic interdependence. These actions 
are concrete reminders of how AU member states can mutually benefit from China’s 
increased influence in the region. 
The AU’s Agenda 2063 flagship projects highlight the need for integrated 
infrastructure development to promote economic growth and poverty reduction in Africa. 
Recent findings by the African Development Bank (AfDB) estimated there is an 
infrastructure financing requirement gap of $52-$92 billion per year. These requirements 
were derived from the minimum infrastructure needs for countries to replace aging 
infrastructure and sustain economic, population, and income growth on the continent.118 
Since poor infrastructure remains a hindrance for both African economies and exports to 
China, this is an area China has focused significant resources. The 2006 and the 2015 
Africa Policy papers both emphasize infrastructure development as one of the key areas 
for economic collaboration as a way to help Africa overcome obstacles constraining 
development.119 Since 2005, the total value of Chinese infrastructure investments in Africa 
has reached almost $2 trillion.120 Markedly, China has pledged support for several highly 
publicized infrastructure projects identified by the AU’s 2063 Agenda. For example, at the 
2015 FOCAC, the AU signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with China for the 
development of an African integrated high-speed train network (AIHSRN) as a flagship 
program in the Agenda 2063. Significantly, the project will connect the 16 landlocked 
African states to neighboring countries and major seaports.121 Highly complementary to 
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the AfCTA, the AIHSRN project is projected to boost African integration, economic 
growth, and intra-regional trade. Although yet to be built, the rail project represents a 
tangible commitment of Chinese support for African economic and political 
development.122  
China’s influence in Africa through critical infrastructure development continues 
to increase. According to Deloitte, China is Africa’s largest financier of infrastructure, 
constructing one out of three projects and financing one out of five on the continent.123 
The number of flagship programs and infrastructure projects funded by China demonstrates 
the AU’s growing dependence on China to achieve regional goals. They also highlight a 
perception that China’s growing presence enables it to influence the AU’s agenda. China’s 
successful push for regional integration backed by tangible infrastructure development 
solidifies its political and economic influence in the AU. These actions enhance China’s 
credibility within the AU and the continent because they help validate China’s claims for 
peaceful development through win-win cooperation, countering negative perceptions.124 
Yet, behind the discourse of equality, the China-Africa relationship is characterized by 
asymmetry and opacity. Furthermore, critical issues hindering the AU’s engagement with 
China are the lack of a unified “China policy” and growing dependence on Chinese aid.125 
C. A COMPETING REGIONAL FRAMEWORK: FOCAC  
Prior to China’s engagement with the AU, China established its own forum for 
Sino-African relations: the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). FOCAC serves 
as the official forum where African and Chinese leaders pursue economic and cultural 
diplomacy. FOCAC was founded out of China’s desire to strengthen “South-South” 
cooperation and solidarity with African countries.126 Currently, all AU member states 
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except Eswatini, which is the only African state to maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 
are members of FOCAC.127 Since its inception in 2000, FOCAC meetings have taken 
place every three years, alternating between China and African countries.128 The 
predictability of FOCAC has helped institutionalize relations between African countries 
and China.129 After each summit, a comprehensive action plan to include China’s pledges 
for export credits, grants, and new loans, is jointly announced for the following three years. 
This has enticed AU member states to pursue bilateral arrangements, which limits the AU’s 
ability to act as the representative voice of a unified Africa. 
China’s symbolic effort to treat all African countries, regardless of size or GDP, 
with respect as diplomatic equals despite obvious power disparities is likely another reason 
for extensive AU member state participation.130 The FOCAC framework also allows China 
to accord all Africa leaders, big and small, with highly publicized equal diplomatic status 
as a symbolic gesture. In return, China requires that participating countries held the “one-
China policy” as a precondition to establishing diplomatic relationships.131 The FOCAC 
platform enables China to promote its vision of a “community with a shared future for 
mankind” and its position as a powerful representative of the developing world.132 FOCAC 
appeals to African leaders using South-South solidarity and anti-colonial affinities as a 
foundation for “working towards the establishment of a new international political and 
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economic order in the 21st century.”133 FOCAC offers a unique opportunity for politically 
isolated African countries due to China’s diplomatic approach that stresses respect for each 
other’s sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.134  
One indicator of the level of importance AU member states attach to the FOCAC 
summits can be seen by the near-universal attendance by African leaders. At the most 
recent FOCAC, the African Union Commission (AUC) and 51 out of 55 African leaders 
attended.135 Remarkably, 48 of the African leaders were heads of state. In comparison, the 
2020 UK-Africa summit was only attended by 15 being heads of state and the 2018 UN 
General Assembly less than half that of FOCAC.136 Broadcasting these government-to-
government relations is also vitally important to China’s ability to shape international 
perceptions. The financial enticements given through loans and pledges at FOCAC can 
largely be construed as a crucial motivator for AU member state participation.137  
The AU participates as a member in FOCAC, graduating from observer status to a 
full member in 2011. At that point, the AU agreed to strengthen the dialog and cooperation 
with China within the FOCAC framework. The AU’s addition to FOCAC also signifies an 
opportunity for African states to potentially put forth a unified voice for a more assertive 
role in the FOCAC agenda, trade negotiations, infrastructure and developmental 
investment deals, and environmental concerns. However, although the AU is now a full 
member of FOCAC, its status is only equal to individual AU member states. Therefore, 
FOCAC remains a Chinese initiative where the AU holds little influence over the agenda, 
budget, and level of engagement.  
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While FOCAC offers a clear plan for Chinese engagement in Africa, the AU has 
no official stance on China-African relations.138 Furthermore, China has continued to 
stress financial and diplomatic coordination between China and both the AU and individual 
member states within the FOCAC framework. For instance, most of the MoUs and 
financial support for the AU have been negotiated and implemented within the FOCAC 
framework where China has a distinct advantage. This insistence limits the AU’s 
effectiveness because FOCAC remains a Chinese initiative.139 Moreover, the AU’s 
dependence on Chinese financial generosity to accomplish flagship programs is becoming 
increasingly evident. As a result, African leaders continue to negotiate bilateral agreements 
most beneficial to their own countries at FOCAC, sidelining the AU as a mere participant 
in some cases. Given the enormous resource disparity between China and individual AU 
member states, African leaders are often left with little negotiating power. Critics argue 
that China reinforces African dependency rather than mutual cooperation.140  
1. China’s Bilateral Agreements Undermine the AU’s Goals for Peace and 
Security 
While FOCAC exhibits many multilateral characteristics, aid and investment 
agreements continue to be rooted in bilateral arrangements between individual AU member 
states and China.141 A vast percentage of African infrastructure projects are financed by 
Chinese loans or built by Chinese companies.142 However, not all of these China’s bilateral 
infrastructure projects fulfill the AU’s regional objectives. In Ethiopia, Chinese companies 
primarily funded and built a $365 million dam on the Tekeze River and 70 percent of 
Ethiopia’s roads have been built by Chinese companies.143 Additionally, Ethiopia awarded 
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the China Road and Bridge Corporation a $67 million contract to expand the Addis Ababa 
airport in 2010 and the China Railway Group a $1.1 billion contract for the Ethiopia-
Djibouti railway project in 2011.144 China’s infrastructure projects have faced criticism 
from environmental experts and added to Ethiopia’s debt burden.145  
Furthermore, some of China’s infrastructure projects have destabilized the region, 
undermining the AU’s goal for peace and stability. For example, although China is not the 
primary financier of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), China has provided 
significant financing for the turbines and electrical equipment for the hydroelectric plants 
through bilateral relations developed within the FOCAC framework.146 Additionally, 
Chinese companies won the contract to build the power transmission lines connecting the 
GERD to Ethiopia’s power grid infrastructure, which is vital to the GERD’s operation.147 
Ethiopia attaches great national importance to the GERD because it has the potential to 
supercharge Ethiopia’s economy, where 65 percent of the country is not currently 
connected to electricity.148 Experts predict the GERD will more than double Ethiopia’s 
energy output, making it a net energy exporter.149 Since China is Ethiopia’s largest trading 
partner, increased energy exports is likely a key motivator for China’s involvement.150 
Yet, the GERD has created huge diplomatic tensions between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt.  
China’s financial and material support for the construction of the GERD gives 
Ethiopia considerable control over the flow of the Nile river, amplifying regional tensions 
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since 90 percent of Egypt’s population relies on the Nile for water.151 Both Egypt and 
Sudan have emphasized the need for a binding agreement to regulate the filling and 
operation of the GERD. Ethiopia has rejected the need for a binding agreement, leading to 
fear that Ethiopia will leave too much water in the reservoir during droughts causing 
vulnerable downstream countries harm. Conspicuously, China has distanced itself from the 
negotiations despite the fact that Chinese companies have been heavily involved in the 
construction of the dam. For example, in March 2020, the China Gezhouba Group and 
Voith Hydro Shanghai were awarded $40.1 million and $113 million in contracts to 
accelerate the pace of the dam construction despite increasing tensions between Ethiopia 
and Egypt.152 At the same time, the Egyptian Foreign Minister called unilateral action 
taken by Ethiopia to fill the dam “a threat of potentially existential proportions.”153 
Negotiations have gone on for years, but recent meditation led by the AU and the U.S. 
ended with both Ethiopia and Egypt threatening military action over the GERD.154 China’s 
involvement is indirectly fueling this regional conflict with little sign that it will assist the 
AU calm tensions. 
2. Shaping a Future Generation of Leaders 
FOCAC goes beyond economic and security agreements to include training 
programs intended to shape political norms in the region and global perceptions on Chinese 
policies. Education is a key pillar of bilateral engagements at the FOCAC summit because 
it also enables China to directly engage with heads of state, local elites, and other 
government officials on a wide range of capacity building programs. Since the 2006 
FOCAC summit, China has announced scholarship targets to aid African students studying 
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in China, pledging financial and political support. In 2014, China passed the UK and the 
U.S. as a top destination for African students.155 At the most recent FOCAC summit in 
2018, China pledged to provide Africa with a “tailor-made program to train 1,000 high-
caliber Africans,” 50,000 government-funded scholarships, and 50,000 training 
opportunities for skills development workshops.156 In past FOCAC summits, China has 
also pledged to boost educational and vocational scholarships through increased funding 
towards teachers and Chinese language programs.157 For example, workshops on political 
capacity teach China’s model of government to officials, including topics on how to build 
a party, manage public opinion, and alleviate poverty.158 Additionally, China has also 
sought to shape Africa’s media practices through educational exchanges. For instance, 
training workshops given to media professionals include topics on media management on 
China’s politics, Chinese culture, and Sino-African relations.159  
Significantly, China’s capacity training programs and scholarship opportunities are 
typically held in China. Scholarships and delegations funded by China provide future and 
current African leaders with firsthand experiences of China’s successful economic 
development. These experiences deepen relations between China and AU member states 
and bolster China’s soft power because the participants are journalists, government 
officials, and African youth that will shape the future of African relations with China. 
Furthermore, China has utilized the FOCAC framework to install more than 50 Confucius 
Institutes on the continent as part of its commitment to expand educational and cultural 
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exchanges. These exchanges have increased the popularity of learning the Chinese 
language, suggesting some of Africa’s youth is receptive to benefiting from China’s 
growing influence in Africa.160 This is a significant development because soft power 
influence relies on shared values that can be developed through these cultural and 
educational exchanges.161 These exchanges act as a powerful bridge between the two 
continents, creating lasting relationships between China and key individuals that may 
become future leaders in the AU.162 Commitments at FOCAC summits give China the 
opportunity to utilize China’s significant resources as a tool for cultural diplomacy to win 
the hearts and minds of AU member states.163  
Furthermore, extensively, friendly news coverage enables China to reach a broader 
audience for FOCAC summits that focuses on positive images of China’s generosity and 
constructive engagements.164 For instance, more than 2,600 journalists registered to attend 
the 2018 FOCAC summit, which likely included many who have benefitted or will benefit 
from China’s vocational scholarships.165 According to Joseph Nye, wielding soft power in 
the information age may be ultimately determined by those who control the narrative.166 
Notably, these vocational training programs, as well as Confucius Institutes, are 
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government-funded with specific intentions to “tell China’s story well” as a means to shape 
African perceptions.167  
However, critics believe these programs are designed to train professionals to 
advance China’s propaganda machine by encouraging censorship, amplifying positive 
Chinese stories, and influencing public opinion.168 Ultimately, Chinese-trained reporters 
have the potential to sway African leaders into making policy decisions that will benefit 
the Chinese government but go against the interests of the AU. According to one former 
Xinhua employee, the goals of these programs “were loud and clear, to push a distinctly 
Chinese agenda.”169 These workshops are supported by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and systematically provide pro-regime content meant to increase not only China’s 
“discourse power,” but its ideological influence in the region.170 With these programs, 
China could be enabling non-democratic principles by handing African leaders 
authoritarian tools that go against AU ideals.  
In addition to increasing regional tensions, the FOCAC framework may undermine 
the AU’s promotion of human rights and democratic principles. The AU’s participation in 
FOCAC, as a member, associates it with decisions that may compromise its organizational 
aspirations for democratic principles for the region. Although China is not overtly 
attempting to convert democratic African governments into authoritarian nations, these 
capacity training programs provide the foundation for those looking to emulate the Chinese 
Communist Party methods, which contradicts the AU’s core objectives for democracy 
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promotion and good governance.171 According to Yun Sun, the Stimson Center’s East Asia 
Program co-director, there are noticeable changes to several AU member states’ 
government styles as a result of deepening engagements through FOCAC initiatives.172 
For example, Angola and Ethiopia, among others, have explicitly taken actions to emulate 
China’s development model, taking inspiration from its “emphasis on strong export-led 
growth, heavy state involvement in the economy, and the development of labor-intensive 
industries.”173 According to a new Afrobarameter report, China now ranks second (after 
the U.S.) as a development model to emulate, and 63% of all countries surveyed held a 
favorable view of China’s influence in Africa.174 Therefore, China’s engagement in Africa 
may be creating a “safe space” for non-democratic forms of government. The 2020 
Freedom in the World report documented that a total of 22 African suffered a decline in 
their scores.175 China cannot be entirely attributed to this decline, but it is providing the 
training and tools for these governments to act in a way contrary to the AU’s principles. 
D. SUMMARY 
The AU’s main objectives are to promote inclusive, sustainable development, 
economic prosperity, and advance regional integration based on the ideals of Pan-
Africanism driven by its own citizens.176 This chapter examined the AU’s struggle to 
achieve its objectives of sustainable development, economic prosperity, democratic 
principles, and continental integration and unity. Financial deficiencies, staffing 
challenges, and wider management issues have hindered the AU’s ability to realize flagship 
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initiatives and enforce adherence to desired regional norms. These shortcomings have also 
forced the AU to rely on foreign donors, such as China, to address critical gaps in 
infrastructure development and peacekeeping efforts. Since China has targeted support for 
AU’s flagship projects and peacekeeping efforts, the AU has welcomed China’s 
engagement within the region.  
By committing to help accomplish key flagship initiatives and developing security 
ties with the AU, China has helped the AU achieve some of its core objectives while 
elevating the AU’s global image. With these actions, however, China is cultivating a 
potentially commanding base of diplomatic support since AU member states amount to 
more than a quarter of the UN General Assembly. This approach appears to be paying 
political dividends for China because it has gained political support from African countries 
in international institutions, such as the UN. Although not unanimous, this support has 
enabled China to block UN resolutions on human rights abuses and could be construed as 
distinct instances of reciprocating political support by African leaders with a keen interest 
in maintaining China’s infrastructure financing.177 Yet, this support to block a resolution 
on China’s human rights violations goes against the AU’s commitment to protect human 
rights and instill regional norms of social justice and good governance. 
This chapter detailed why the lack of resources and AU member state unity hampers 
the AU’s ability to establish a unified approach to counteract negative aspects of China’s 
influence. Additionally, the chapter demonstrated why FOCAC works as a mechanism to 
bypass the AU because it encourages AU member states to pursue lucrative bilateral 
arrangements, which further restricts the AU’s limited ability to act as the representative 
voice of a unified Africa. Lastly, this chapter identified how China’s impact on the AU 
goes beyond infrastructure and economic development. Chinese capacity training 
programs, particularly the media and political variety, directly impact the AU’s objectives 
to establish regional norms of good governance and democratic principles. Because 
FOCAC summits are highly publicized and widely attended, it serves as a vital platform to 
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reconsolidate China’s message and reinject confidence that China offers support for AU 
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In the last several decades, Southeast Asia has emerged as a vitally important region 
for global trade, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the key 
regional institution. Since its implementation, ASEAN has taken a comprehensive 
approach for peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. ASEAN’s core strength lies in 
the unique sense of community it has cultivated, despite the incredible diversity among its 
members. ASEAN balances internal divisions by adopting policies that promote inclusivity 
and economic prosperity without compromising its core interests or centrality in the 
region.178 Relative to the African Union, ASEAN is a stronger regional institution because 
it maintains a strong sense of centrality regarding regional affairs.179 
China presents two distinct issues for ASEAN: challenges to regional security and 
challenges to institutional effectiveness. Because South China Sea (SCS) maritime 
disputes amplify internal divisions within ASEAN, competing claims over the SCS 
showcase ASEAN’s vulnerabilities. Additionally, China’s political and financial 
support for individual ASEAN member states amplifies existing cleavages and 
competing priorities between its members, but does not break ASEAN’s institutional 
efficacy. A case study of Cambodia demonstrates how both of these issues test, but 
do not destroy, ASEAN’s consensus-based governance style, which relies on 
institutional unity. The chapter also shows how ASEAN is responding to China’s 
influence in the region using tools of institutional enmeshment and diplomatic hedging. 
Furthermore, using collective negotiation, ASEAN has reached free trade agreements 
(FTAs) with China that benefit both parties, despite the varying levels of economic 
development and competing priorities of ASEAN member states.  
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A. THE FOUNDATIONS OF ASEAN 
ASEAN was established as a forum for diverse member states to meet to identify 
common issues facing the region in an era when Southeast Asia was riddled with intra-
regional conflicts.180 In 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the 
Philippines signed the ASEAN Declaration that established the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations as a formal regional institution.181 At the time, territorial disputes such as 
those over Sabah between Malaysia and the Philippines were the primary source of tension 
among original ASEAN member states.182 Initially, ASEAN disavowed a formal security 
alliance because member states believed economic security led to greater integration and 
stability in the region.183 As a result, ASEAN’s initial objectives were limited to promoting 
peace and stability, accelerating economic growth, and fostering cultural development and 
social progress towards a regional identity.184 
Due to their distinct cultures, histories, and priorities, ASEAN members 
implemented consultation and consensus principles as the foundation of ASEAN’s 
operating framework.185 ASEAN’s core values of non-interference in each other’s internal 
affairs, mutual respect for state sovereignty, “the right of every state to lead its national 
existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion,” the rejection of the use 
of force and preference for settling disputes by peaceful means, and an emphasis on intra-
regional cooperation reflect the internal diplomacy required to engage and unify a diverse 
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group of member states.186 Since many ASEAN members are concerned about interference 
in their domestic affairs, ASEAN’s consensus-based governance was born out of the desire 
to promote trust among members by ensuring equality, since requiring consensus for 
significant decisions prevents the marginalization of any member.187 Consensus decision-
making “gives every member state a veto,” which enables any member to object to an idea 
or proposal.188 Unlike more formal institutions such as the European Union, the informal 
format of consensus decision-making and consultation has been vital to ASEAN’s 
success.189 
Today, ASEAN has expanded to ten member states: Brunei joined in 1984, 
Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.190 The membership 
expansion from the ASEAN-5 members to the current ten member states has further 
stressed these tensions. ASEAN’s membership expansion has tested its internal 
cohesion and capacity for consensus-based decision-making.191 Cambodia and Laos, 
ASEAN’s newest and least developed members, add complexity to ASEAN members’ 
political and economic divisions. The larger membership has increased the difficulty 
of reaching a common denominator between members because their national interests 
often diverge.192 Political, ethnic, and developmental divisions have been viewed as 
ASEAN’s greatest vulnerability because they open the door to intra-regional rivalries 
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and leave the potential for an extra-regional power to manipulate one member against 
another.193  
Critics often note ASEAN’s willingness to “talk shop” through informal settings, 
making process but not progress.194 For example, some claim ASEAN lacked the capacity 
to facilitate a coordinated regional response to the Asian financial crisis in the early 1990s, 
despite numerous meetings and declarations.195 In 2007, ASEAN took a significant step 
towards strengthening its institutional mechanisms by establishing the ASEAN Charter.196 
The new charter not only attempted to integrate ASEAN’s core principles into a coherent 
framework, but it also pushed for the adoption of democratic values and respect for human 
rights.197 Additionally, the charter outlined a formal institutional structure and legal 
framework for ASEAN.198  
Because the charter aspires to transform ASEAN into a rules-based community, it 
was a marked departure from ASEAN members’ historical reluctance to establishing strong 
institutions.199 However, critics observed that the charter still adheres to ASEAN’s 
traditional principles of consensus-based decision-making and non-interference.200 
Furthermore, critics note that the charter lacks provisions to enforce sanctions or other 
mechanisms to punish member states that do not follow the charter because member state 
adherence is voluntary. Although the charter possesses some weaknesses, it is still 
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considered significant progress towards uniting members around a clearly defined 
regional identity.201 Furthermore, the charter demonstrates ASEAN’s commitment 
to strengthening the institution to cope with evolving regional dynamics. Evidence 
of ASEAN’s success as an institution is shown by its continued relevance and 
existence where others have failed. 
1. The Significance of ASEAN Regional Centrality 
Since its establishment, ASEAN policies have been consciously geared toward  
preserving autonomy and avoiding interference from extra-regional powers.202 The 
concept of ASEAN centrality refers to ASEAN’s desire to maintain autonomy by ensuring 
it remains the driving force or “institutional hub” for managing regional affairs.203 As an 
organization, ASEAN often experiences tensions between pro-China and pro-U.S. member 
states.204 Both China and the United States account for a significant portion of ASEAN 
members’ economies through trade and investment; therefore, this poses a challenge to 
ASEAN because of its desire to maintain stability and pursue regional prosperity.205 
ASEAN centrality supports the institution’s strategic interests in the region by ensuring its 
relevance with extra-regional powers seeking to influence the region.206  
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ASEAN and ASEAN member states are experiencing increasing pressure to take 
sides in the great power competition between China and the United States in the region.207 
ASEAN’s centrality could be undermined by the escalating tensions and increased 
competition between China and the United States.208 For example, China prefers to frame 
the SCS disputes between itself and individual claimants, leaving ASEAN a limited role in 
managing the conflict.209 This stance resonates with some ASEAN members because of 
regional preferences for non-interference, but others fear a return to a Sino-centric regional 
order. ASEAN has cautiously pushed back on China’s vision for an ASEAN-China 
Community of Common Destiny (CCD) because of the perception that it would 
compromise ASEAN’s commitment to an “open and inclusive regional order.”210 Several 
ASEAN members have pursued defense cooperation with the United States to balance 
escalating tensions and Chinese aggression in the SCS.211 On the other hand, ASEAN also 
sees the United States’ foreign policy approach of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) as 
a means to exclude or isolate China.212 
ASEAN’s commitment to an inclusive and open Indo-Pacific signifies it intends to 
work with both the United States and China to achieve regional goals.213 ASEAN 
                                                 
207 Daniel Kliman, Addressing China’s Influence in Southeast Asia: America’s Approach and the 
Role of Congress, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), accessed May 26, 2020, 
https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/addressing-chinas-influence-in-southeast-asia-
americas-approach-and-the-role-of-congress.; Jones and Smith, “Making Process, Not Progress.” Cheng-
Chwee Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States’ Alignment Behavior towards 
China,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100 (July 3, 2016): 500–514, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1132714. 
208 Ralf Emmers, “ASEAN’s Search for Neutrality in the South China Sea,” Asian Journal of 
Peacebuilding; Seoul 2, no. 1 (May 2014): 61–77. 
209 Ian Storey, “Assessing the ASEAN-China Framework for the Code of Conduct for the South 
China Sea,” Yusof Ishak Institute, no. 62 (August 9, 2017): 6. 
210 Ha, “Understanding China’s Proposal for an ASEAN-China Community of Common Destiny and 
ASEAN’s Ambivalent Response,” 241–8. 
211 Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge?” 509. 
212 “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” ASEAN, June 23, 2019, https://asean.org/asean-outlook-
indo-pacific/. 
213 Amitav Acharya, “Why ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outlook Matters,” East Asia Forum, August 11, 
2019, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/08/11/why-aseans-indo-pacific-outlook-matters/. 
   
 
47 
centrality also points to a normative approach to regional diplomacy.214 The 
“ASEAN Way” is deliberately non-binding and inclusive to promote a shared 
identity that builds confidence and induces “strategic restraint” among members.215 
The key to ASEAN’s success depends on its strategic ability to build trust between 
disparate Southeast Asian countries of Southeast Asia, while both “insulating the region 
from Great Power politics and promoting a people-centered outlook.”216 Meaning, 
ASEAN indirectly pushes against both the United States’ and China’s desire for exclusive 
partnerships without directly antagonizing either country or losing centrality of regional 
issues to either country. 
2. Competing Claims over the South China Sea Highlight ASEAN’s 
Vulnerabilities  
China’s rise as a global and regional power is the core challenge to ASEAN. 
ASEAN member states’ geographic proximity and relative size (both population and 
economy) to China make them vulnerable to the uncertainty caused by China’s growing 
influence in the region. Currently, China claims more than 80 percent of the SCS, which 
conflicts with rival claims from Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and 
Vietnam.217 Maritime disputes and the militarization of artificial islands in the SCS have 
ignited intense debate on China’s ambitions for carving out a sphere of influence in 
Southeast Asia. A rising China that projects growing wealth and increasing military 
capabilities challenges regional stability in Southeast Asia because it garners mixed 
responses from ASEAN member states. Consequently, ASEAN has struggled with 
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establishing a common stance regarding maritime territorial disputes with its members and 
China in the SCS.218 
Varied threat perceptions regarding China’s aggression in the SCS threatens to 
divide ASEAN member state unity because it amplifies internal divisions within ASEAN. 
For some, China’s growing engagement in the region brings both diplomatic and economic 
opportunities; however, for others, it creates tensions and concerns over China’s ambitions 
as a regional hegemon.219 For example, because Cambodia’s economic development 
depends on China as a trading partner and financial investor, Cambodia has often opposed 
more aggressive measures proposed to ASEAN regarding the SCS.220 Like Cambodia, 
Myanmar and Laos have significant economic incentives to remain less vocal and 
avoid internationalizing South China Sea disputes.221 As non-claimant states, all three 
countries have held an ambivalent stance towards the SCS disputes.222  
However, not all non-claimant ASEAN members exhibit the same disinterest in 
resolving the SCS disputes. For example, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore have 
demonstrated an active interest in finding a regional solution to preserve freedom of 
navigation and regional stability.223 Additionally, ASEAN members with overlapping 
territorial claims in the SCS have reacted to Chinese aggression with varying degrees of 
force. Some ASEAN members fear China is attempting to return to a Sino-centric 
hierarchal system for the region.224 For example, the Philippines and Vietnam have raised 
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their concerns at international forums and demonstrated the desire to legalize the SCS 
disputes.225 On the other hand, Brunei and Malaysia have demonstrated reluctance to 
legalize or internationalize SCS disputes, favoring less antagonistic diplomacy.226 As a 
result, ASEAN has struggled to acknowledge China as a regional threat regarding maritime 
territorial disputes in the SCS.227  
Furthermore, member states have overlapping SCS claims with each other. This 
intra-member rivalry remains another obstacle preventing ASEAN from reaching a unified 
stance on how to approach Chinese aggression in the SCS.228 For example, Malaysia and 
Vietnam have been embroiled in numerous disputes over fishing rights in the SCS.229 
According to Reuters, the most recent disagreement ended in violence. These critical 
differences between claimant states further complicate ASEAN’s response to the SCS 
disputes. 
B. CHINA’S TEST AND THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC LEVERAGE: A 
CASE STUDY OF CAMBODIA 
Although China officially supports ASEAN, China’s vast economic resources have 
been able to weaken ASEAN’s unity by dividing member states’ priorities through 
economic inducements. ASEAN’s least developed members, Laos and Cambodia, have 
often been criticized for their reluctance to condemn China’s aggression in the South China 
Sea. Both countries receive significant financial assistance from China. Cambodia’s 
economic development is closely tied to Chinese aid and investment.230 Additionally, 
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China stands as Cambodia’s closest political ally and a key defense partner as Cambodia’s 
largest military aid donor.231 For instance, after reportedly signing a secret agreement to 
allow China access to Ream Naval Base, Cambodia has refused U.S. funding for repairs 
and demolished a U.S.-built facility at the Ream.232 
Cambodia has substantial incentives to stay out of SCS conflicts because of its 
dependence on China. Furthermore, as a non-claimant state, Cambodia has more interest 
in achieving economic and developmental goals than SCS maritime disputes.233 In other 
words, the loss of China’s financial support would be more detrimental to Cambodia. As a 
result, Cambodia has unilaterally opposed more aggressive measures proposed to ASEAN 
regarding the SCS.234 For example, when Cambodia held the position as ASEAN’s chair 
in 2012, it distinctly sought to downplay SCS concerns and campaigned to include China 
in ASEAN discussions, despite growing tensions like the Scarborough Shoal’s incident.235 
Cambodia’s refusal to compromise presented a serious challenge to ASEAN’s unity.236 
Due to a lack of consensus among ASEAN members surrounding the issue, ASEAN failed 
to release a joint communique in 2012, which was “unprecedented in ASEAN’s forty-five 
year history.”237 Many saw Cambodia’s actions as an attempt to appease China and pivotal 
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to ASEAN’s failure in 2012.238 In fact, Cambodia and the Philippines openly feuded over 
their differences in 2012.239 Furthermore, at the time, China used ASEAN’s disunity over 
the SCS to suspend negotiations on the Code of Conduct.240  
Cambodia’s role has therefore been seen as a “spoiler” to ASEAN negotiations on 
the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.241 As a non-claimant, Cambodia has insisted 
that the SCS territorial disputes between China and ASEAN members should be handled 
at the bilateral level, not in a multilateral format.242 Leading scholar Amitav Acharya 
believes Cambodia used its position as the ASEAN chair to challenge the position of more 
established ASEAN member states, such as Singapore and the Philippines, to please 
China.243 In 2016, for example, Cambodia played a key role in blocking a joint ASEAN 
Communique that included a “strongly worded statement” following China’s 
dismissal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in favor of the Philippines 
in contradiction of China’s claims in the South China Sea.244 Cambodia’s stance 
directly contradicted the Philippines’ and Vietnam’s request to include a statement 
regarding the incident in the joint communiqué.245 In return, Cambodia received praise 
from China for its “neutrality” in the SCS dispute and China promised $600 million in 
aid.246 A former Chinese ambassador to Cambodia also lauded Cambodia’s actions in 
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2012, stating, “not only the governments of China but also millions of our people 
appreciated Prime Minister Hun Sen’s stance.”247 Consequently, Cambodia has earned a 
reputation as a Chinese ally. Cambodia’s actions present a significant challenge to ASEAN 
because its strength lies in its inclusive and consensus-based governance style. 
C. ENMESHING CHINA IN REGIONAL SECURITY NORMS 
Despite the challenges of Cambodia to ASEAN, there are several areas in which 
ASEAN has been successful in getting China to conform to regional norms. ASEAN’s 
preference for regional cooperation and inclusivity formed the basis of its multilateral 
efforts to integrate China into the regional order.248 ASEAN’s ongoing response to 
China’s growing influence has been a “complex engagement” strategy intended to 
improve Sino-ASEAN cooperation and persuade China to accept ASEAN norms.249 
This method assumes that repeated social, political, and economic interactions 
between ASEAN and China will emphasize mutual benefits and modify China’s 
behavior through enmeshment, thus reducing the risk of Chinese dominance in the 
region.250 
ASEAN-led multilateral forums act as normative instruments, providing a direct 
avenue for ASEAN to build relationships with extra-regional powers and a centralized 
platform to socialize expected behaviors that shape the region’s security agenda.251 For 
example, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an ASEAN-led political and security 
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dialogue that includes all ASEAN member states and 17 Asia-Pacific partners.252 Despite 
China’s initial reservations, ASEAN’s prominent role alleviated suspicions that the ARF 
would be a Western-dominated security organization.253 Notably, admittance into the ARF 
requires a prior commitment to respect the ARF’s decisions and provide resources towards 
peace and security in the region.254 Like ASEAN, the ARF uses consensus-based 
governance and consultative mechanisms to foster a constructive dialogue for peace and 
security in the Asia-Pacific. 
China’s participation in ARF required acknowledgment of ASEAN’s regional 
security expectations, and through this process, its actions have become marginally 
constrained in the region.255 For instance, at the 2010 ARF summit, five ASEAN claimants 
and the United States demonstrated how the ARF had become an acceptable venue to 
discuss overlapping maritime claims to push back against Chinese aggression in the 
SCS.256 As a result of diplomatic pressure, China agreed to Guidelines for Implementation 
of the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the SCS.257 The ARF demonstrates 
ASEAN’s ability to encourage regional integration through non-military, de-escalatory 
mechanisms.258 Furthermore, ASEAN can use the ARF as an established venue to keep 
the focus on existing regional norms and pursue the finalization of the COC.259 
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China’s continued involvement in ASEAN-led forums also reinforces the 
importance of ASEAN as the regional institution, further enhancing ASEAN’s credibility 
as a regional and global actor. For instance, China’s willingness to sign the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (TAC), a cornerstone of ASEAN’s regional diplomacy, and ASEAN’s 
Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) indicates success in 
ASEAN’s complex engagement strategy.260 Significantly, China was the first non-
ASEAN signatory of the TAC and the first nuclear power to sign the SEANWFZ.261 Both 
treaties help foster an ASEAN-centric regional security order. Moreover, ASEAN has 
made gradual progress towards reaching a conclusion to the Code of Conduct for the South 
China Sea (COC).262 Although ASEAN and China have not yet come to a resolution of 
the COC, both parties agreed to a framework for the COC in 2017 and a Single Draft 
Negotiating Text (SDNT) in 2018.263 Additionally, at the 2020 ASEAN-China summit, 
China reaffirmed its support for peace and stability in the SCS and committed further to 
strengthen security and defense cooperation through existing ASEAN-led mechanisms.264 
China’s continued participation in COC negotiations implies a sustained effort to become 
a “responsible power” within the region.265 
ASEAN’s diplomatic hedging is another pragmatic approach to China’s rise in the 
region. ASEAN member states have cultivated economic and diplomatic ties with China 
while concurrently seeking political and military support from extra-regional powers such 
as the United States, Japan, and India to off-set risks.266 Traditionally, the United States’ 
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presence in the region signifies financial and military support against Chinese aggression. 
Furthermore, America’s presence gives ASEAN members more potential leverage with 
China due to great power competition.267 For example, Vietnam and Singapore have both 
demonstrated willingness to pursue military assurances but stopped short of developing a 
security alliance with the United States.268 Both explicitly stress their actions are not 
directed against a specific country.269 This hedging provides ASEAN members flexibility 
to maximize individual benefits while reducing the risk of openly antagonizing China or 
inflaming internal disagreements. ASEAN’s hedging behavior stems from its conflict 
avoidance preferences and desire to maintain regional autonomy. However, opportunities 
for political hedging have changed over time due to uncertainty regarding the U.S.’s 
commitment to the region.270 
ASEAN’s effort to encourage active participation from powers outside of SEA is a 
notable departure from its original stance on regionalism, which was to keep the region 
free from external interference or subversion. However, it highlights a complex regional 
architecture that centers on managing regional security issues while maintaining ASEAN 
centrality among geopolitical rivalries.271 ASEAN’s insistence on including India, 
Australia, and New Zealand in the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 and the initiation of 
the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus Eight (ADMM+8) in 2010 demonstrates 
ASEAN’s commitment to regional inclusivity as a means to mitigate China’s growing 
influence in the region.272 The creation of multilateral organizations such as the 
ADMM+8, ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the EAS, and the TAC demonstrate the incremental 
evolution of ASEAN’s evolving stance on regional security and multilateral defense 
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diplomacy.273 These alternative political-security frameworks were designed to 
address the perceived uncertainties stemming from a regional imbalance of power.274 
Since these initiatives are ASEAN-led mechanisms, they enhance ASEAN’s consensus-
building, normative approach to regional diplomacy while reducing the risk 
marginalization by great powers because it enhances the notion of ASEAN’s centrality and 
strategic relevance to regional operations. This shift in diplomacy enables ASEAN to 
leverage extra-regional partners’ experiences and resources to build-up regional 
capabilities without becoming sidelined.  
D. BENEFITTING FROM ECONOMIC TIES DESPITES INTERNAL 
DIVISIONS 
Measured as a group, ASEAN members possess the world’s fifth-largest economy, 
with a total gross domestic product (GDP) of approximately $3 trillion; however, the 
standard of living, the level of development, and the distribution of natural resources vary 
significantly between individual ASEAN members.275 Despite substantial regional 
progress towards poverty reduction, there are still considerable developmental gaps 
between ASEAN member states.276 For that reason, ASEAN member states’ views on 
China’s growing economic influence have been equally diverse. For example, Cambodia 
and Laos have prioritized economic development, viewing China as a key partner to realize 
goals to reduce poverty and improve infrastructure development.277 Conversely, Vietnam 
and the Philippines have stressed the need to balance China’s growing economic influence 
due to security concerns in the SCS. Furthermore, noticeable divisions between ASEAN 
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member states have appeared regarding how to pursue better political and economic 
integration.278 Malaysia, for instance, attempted to establish a protectionist free-trade bloc, 
called the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), that excluded regional neighbors and the 
United States.  
Despite the diverging views of ASEAN member states, economic inducements 
have motivated all ASEAN member states to pursue closer ties with China. In the last two 
decades, trade between ASEAN and China has grown dramatically as ASEAN members 
take advantage of China’s power resources. Starting in the 1990s, ASEAN engaged in 
economic pragmatism and binding engagement principles with China.279 Yet, these 
alignment decisions have required some ASEAN member states to make pragmatic 
decisions to liberalize trade relations with China despite the potential that cheap Chinese 
goods could increasingly compete with goods from their country.280 However, pursuing 
closer economic ties with China alleviated some concerns that China’s rapid growth would 
impede ASEAN members as a “growth spoiler.” 281 Therefore, ASEAN acknowledged 
China as an economic competitor but considered the potential benefits of closer economic 
relations worth the risk. ASEAN has embraced China as an opportunity for economic 
growth but remained wary of unmitigated Chinese influence. 
ASEAN’s deliberate engagement towards economic interdependence with China is 
a key feature of Sino-ASEAN relations.282 Although China still holds a significant trade 
surplus with ASEAN states, ASEAN has been able to collectively negotiate favorable 
concessions in FTAs with China.283 The ASEAN China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) was a 
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milestone in Sino-ASEAN relations because ASEAN members negotiated as a unified 
collective.284 ASEAN believed AFCTA would enable it to become a “priority market” for 
Chinese investors; thus, it was mutually beneficial for all parties involved.285 Although 
China had a heavy hand in structuring the AFCTA, China’s concessions proved ASEAN 
had significant influence in the negotiations. Furthermore, ASEAN’s collective 
negotiations garnered Chinese concessions that offered benefits for both new and old 
ASEAN members, which addresses underlying concerns of growing disparities between 
developed and underdeveloped members.286 For example, the ACFTA gave ASEAN early 
access to Chinese markets, with reduced tariffs, before China extended the offer to all WTO 
members.287 Additionally, ASEAN leaders obtained critical concessions from the Chinese 
government that expanded “import quotas for agricultural goods and a generous ‘early 
harvest provision.’”288 With this deal, ASEAN was finally able to advance regional goals 
of economic integration and cooperation. Additionally, the AFCTA signifies China’s 
growing acceptance of ASEAN’s value as a regional organization.289 This recognition 
further strengthened ASEAN’s centrality and helped boost other extra-regional powers’ 
interest in ASEAN.290  
ASEAN’s selective acceptance of Chinese driven policies is another example of its 
hedging strategy. ASEAN believes that a complex web of interdependence will eventually 
persuade China to accept ASEAN’s regional norms and “think differently and less 
confrontationally about regional security and its relations with the ASEAN states.”291 For 
instance, ASEAN has adopted some Chinese initiatives such as the Regional 
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Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) because they offer financial and practical 
benefits that are not perceived to negatively impact regional interests.292 ASEAN’s most 
recent success at promoting economic integration is the completion of the RCEP, signed at 
the 2020 ASEAN Summit. RCEP is now the world’s largest free-trade agreement and first-
ever trade agreement between China, Japan, and South Korea.293 Although some critics 
label RCEP as a “China-led” initiative, this trade agreement is still a triumph of ASEAN’s 
diplomacy and a testament to its desire to remain central to regional issues.294 After eight 
years of negotiations, RCEP was signed by 15 countries in the Asia Pacific, largely due to 
an “ASEAN-brokered deal” that resolved a stalemate that had persisted since 2012.295 
RCEP is a historic achievement for ASEAN that demonstrates its leading role in 
negotiating multilateral FTA critical to the region’s economic prosperity. 
ASEAN’s drive for economic integration and community-building efforts enhances 
ASEAN’s diplomatic voice and influence in the region.296 For example, ASEAN member 
states have been able to leverage China’s positive economic engagement in the region, such 
as the AFCTA, to diversify their economic interests.297 Instead of merely increasing 
economic interdependence with China, ASEAN member states have also developed FTAs 
and stronger ties with other “economic powerhouses” such as the U.S. and Japan.298 
Additionally, these FTAs reinforce a constructive relationship between ASEAN and extra-
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regional powers.299 Meaning, the dialogue established in FTAs anchors ASEAN’s regional 
centrality.300  
E. SUMMARY 
ASEAN’s main objectives are to promote peace and security, economic 
prosperity, and maintain regional autonomy.301 ASEAN and its member states are 
uniquely vulnerable to challenges presented by China’s growing influence due to 
geographic proximity and economic interdependence.302 Varied threat perceptions 
regarding China’s aggression in the SCS threatens to divide ASEAN unity because it 
amplifies the internal divisions and competing SCS claims within ASEAN. Consequently, 
ASEAN has struggled to establish a common stance regarding maritime territorial disputes 
in the SCS.303 The case study of Cambodia demonstrates how China used competing 
economic and security priorities among ASEAN members to prevent a unified response 
condemning Chinese aggression in the SCS. Through Cambodia, China undermines 
ASEAN by creating disunity among members, hampering the organization’s ability 
to function through consensus-based governance. However, while ASEAN’s 
preference for informal, consensual agreements has become strained by disparate 
state interests and rising tensions in the SCS, it has not broken.  
ASEAN has encouraged institutional enmeshment to integrate China into regional 
norms. ASEAN has attempted to balance internal divisions by adopting complex 
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engagement policies that do not compromise ASEAN’s core interests or centrality in the 
region.304 Despite competing priorities of ASEAN member states and varying levels of 
economic development, ASEAN has been able to reach trade agreements with China that 
benefit both parties using collective negotiation. Moreover, ASEAN has leveraged FTAs, 
such as the RCEP and ACFTA, to facilitate economic growth and anchor its centrality in 
the region. 
Overall, ASEAN has successfully encouraged China’s active participation in 
ASEAN-led forums. ASEAN has shown a capability to evolve as an organization to meet 
current challenges and maintain relevance and centrality in the region. So far, ASEAN has 
avoided both a serious conflict with China and unrecoverable institutional fracturing over 
differing threat perceptions. Yet, China continues to challenge ASEAN members’ 
sovereignty in the SCS. ASEAN has achieved some success in asserting centrality, 
especially in the economic sphere, but a resolution to the SCS disputes remains a critical 
test to ASEAN’s ability to manage regional security affairs.305  
  
                                                 
304 Ha, “Understanding China’s Proposal for an ASEAN-China Community of Common Destiny and 
ASEAN’s Ambivalent Response,” 243. 
305 Thayer, “ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea,” 76. 
   
 
62 













Regional institutions, like the African Union (AU) and Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), can be critical to the stability and economic development of a 
region; however, this depends on institution’s capacity to uphold their central aims. The 
AU’s core objectives, for example, are to establish regional standards for economic 
integration, good governance, democratic principles, and unity for African security and 
developmental challenges.306 Similarly, ASEAN’s core objectives are to promote peace 
and security, economic prosperity, and maintain regional autonomy.307 Over the last 40 
years, China has left its isolation for global integration and influence. As a result, China’s 
participation in many critical international institutions has become increasingly prominent. 
China’s rapid economic growth and increasing presence in regional institutions have 
increased concerns that it seeks to reshape the international order, especially those with 
similar values to the United States. This thesis found that China’s success has not been 
uniform, nor its approach a one-size-fits-all. Therefore, both ASEAN and the AU may 
become strategic battlegrounds for shaping regional norms and values.308 Examining 
responses to China’s influence campaigns in ASEAN and the AU are essential indicators 
for understanding China’s global impact. 
This thesis sought to answer the following research question: How are the AU and 
ASEAN responding to China’s attempts to increase influence. This thesis investigated how 
the AU and ASEAN react to China’s influence by assessing their overall strength and the 
ability to uphold their desired regional norms. The first hypothesis predicted that strong 
regional institutions would maintain regional normative values and partner with China on 
terms beneficial for the region. Signs of a strong institution included creating binding 
agreements or enforcing adherence to established institutional norms. The second 
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hypothesis predicted China would be able to exploit weak institutions to shape regional 
norms to serve its own interests. Signs of a weak institution included deep political or social 
divisions, financial difficulties, competing member state priorities, and domestic instability 
or corruption that impedes regional coordination. The third hypothesis predicted that 
institutional responses differed where member states perceived China as a regional threat 
irrespective of institutional strength. In the next section, I will lay out the thesis’ main 
findings. 
A. EVALUATING THE AFRICAN UNION’S RESPONSE TO CHINA 
The AU’s core objectives aim for economic prosperity through regional integration, 
democratic ideals, and stability within the region.309 This research concludes that the AU 
is a weak institution because of the lack of financial resources, management capacity, and 
its inability to enforce these normative values. For example, competing member state 
interests and reverence for national sovereignty allows African governments to pursue 
regime security over their citizens’ or the region’s welfare, weakening the AU’s 
institutional unity.310 Significantly, most of the AU’s funding comes from external donors 
like China because the AU cannot enforce adherence to annual dues.311  
In contrast to ASEAN’s security challenge in the South China Sea, China and the 
AU’s interests for a stable and prosperous African continent often intersect due to extensive 
Chinese business interests like infrastructure development.312 China’s financial and 
political support for the AU’s flagship projects has helped the AU progress towards 
accomplishing key regional goals such as infrastructure development. Because China is 
seen mainly as a financial backer and key donor for infrastructure development and 
peacekeeping forces, the research did not find clear instances where member states 
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perceived China as a regional threat. Therefore, there is no conclusive evidence to support 
the third hypothesis.  
China’s financial and political support has led to the AU’s growing dependence on 
China, increasing China’s influence over regional initiatives. These actions enhance 
China’s credibility within the AU and the continent because they help validate China’s 
claims for peaceful development, countering negative perceptions.313 Yet, China’s 
formidable resources entice AU member states to pursue bilateral arrangements, which 
limits the AU’s ability to act as the representative voice of a unified Africa. Additionally, 
this research found some of China’s bilateral infrastructure projects, such as the GERD, 
have destabilized the region, undermining the AU’s goal for peace and stability. This is a 
major source of friction within the AU because member states remain beholden to China’s 
financial support. Furthermore, China’s avid support for non-interference principles has 
further cemented the concept, limiting the likelihood that the AU could hold China 
accountable for China’s part in destabilizing the region. 
This thesis found the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is a platform 
used to subvert the AU’s desire to promote good governance, democratic ideals, and 
sustainable development that is driven by its own citizens. The research found that the 
AU’s institutional deficiencies hampered the AU’s ability to present a collective voice on 
the global stage. For example, the AU has no official stance on China-African relations.314 
The lack of a unified African voice leaves room for corruption, political instability, and 
predatory practices by both domestic and foreign actors.315 FOCAC, as a competing and 
more established regional institution, undermines the AU’s ability to act as the preeminent 
recognized voice for the region. Furthermore, these deficiencies hampered the AU’s ability 
to present a collective voice at FOCAC. Without the strength of a unified collective, the 
AU participates in FOCAC as a member equal to individual member states, not as a leader, 
holding little influence over the agenda, budget, and level of engagement. FOCAC 
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demonstrates how a Chinese-led initiative can exploit institutional weaknesses, such as the 
AU’s lack of funding and resources, to pursue China’s strategic interests.  
B. EVALUATING ASEAN’S RESPONSE TO CHINA 
ASEAN’s key regional goals are to uphold regional centrality, foster peace and 
security, and accelerate economic prosperity.316 This  thesis found that ASEAN is 
responding to China’s influence in the region using tools of institutional enmeshment and 
diplomatic hedging to advance its core objectives. This thesis, moreover, determined that 
ASEAN was able to more effectively achieve this goal because it is a strong institution that 
has continued to maintain centrality to regional issues and has gradually encouraged 
Chinese adherence to regional norms and values. Overall, this thesis found that ASEAN 
has successfully inspired China’s active participation in ASEAN-led forums. In contrast to 
the AU, ASEAN has shown a capability to evolve as an organization to meet current 
challenges and maintain relevance and centrality in the region. Using collective 
negotiation, ASEAN has reached free trade agreements with China that benefit both 
parties, despite the varying levels of economic development and competing priorities of 
ASEAN member states. The concessions ASEAN secured in its FTA demonstrated that an 
institutions’ strength could affect the outcome of these agreements. Moreover, China’s 
continued participation in ASEAN-led initiatives reinforces ASEAN’s status as the 
regional leader, further strengthen its ability to shape regional norms. As China’s 
enmeshment in ASEAN governed institutions deepens, so too do the costs of not adhering 
to these desired norms. 
In comparison to the AU’s relatively straightforward findings, this thesis found that 
ASEAN’s response to China is not clear cut. Despite its strengths, ASEAN also 
demonstrates some signs of a weak institution because competing member state priorities 
have led to political and social divisions that impede regional coordination. Cambodia’s 
case study illustrates how China uses competing economic priorities among ASEAN 
members to prevent a unified response condemning Chinese aggression in the SCS. As a 
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non-claimant state, Cambodia’s priority is financial security; therefore, Cambodia’s 
reliance on China as an economic partner creates significant incentives to oppose 
aggressive measures proposed by ASEAN members regarding the SCS.317 
Subsequently, ASEAN has struggled to establish a unified stance regarding maritime 
territorial disputes in the SCS.318 This thesis shows how China’s political and financial 
support for individual ASEAN member states exacerbates existing cleavages and 
competing priorities between its members but has not broken ASEAN’s institutional 
efficacy. 
This thesis identified how ASEAN and its member states are susceptible to 
challenges presented by China’s growing military and political influence due to geographic 
proximity.319 An examination of ASEAN highlighted how varied threat perceptions of 
China’s actions in the SCS affected alignment choices. For example, when member states 
such as Vietnam and the Philippines recognized China as a security threat in the SCS, they 
were more willing to speak out against Chinese actions.320 In contrast, Cambodia 
highlights how varied threat perceptions regarding China’s actions in the SCS threatens to 
divide ASEAN member state unity. Cambodia exemplifies how China can exploit 
ASEAN’s consensus-based governance style, using economic inducements to amplify 
member states’ disparate interests. This thesis establishes that ASEAN’s mixed security 
prioritization in the SCS weakens ASEAN’s unity because it amplifies the internal 
divisions and competing maritime claims within ASEAN. With Cambodia’s partnership, 
China undermines ASEAN by amplifying disunity among members, hampering the 
organization’s ability to function through consensus-based governance. 
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C. LIKELY FUTURE TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This research revealed the common trends between ASEAN and the AU are 
China’s use of financial resources and free-trade agreements to increase regional influence 
and enhance its reputation as a responsible partner. Although the AU and ASEAN’s FTA 
with China differ on many levels, both demonstrate China’s willingness to help orchestrate 
economic development and both benefit both China and the regions. In these instances, 
China used its economic and diplomatic clout to galvanize support for regional economic 
integration. These FTAs provide evidence that China is most successful in gaining 
influence when its interests align with institutional goals such as economic prosperity and 
regional integration. Because the institution stands to benefit from these arrangements 
mutually, these common interests make it more likely for institutions to accept China’s 
presence because they reduce security concerns. China’s prominent role in negotiating both 
FTAs represents its ability to capitalize on shared preferences to bolster its image as a 
reliable partner and responsible actor. If the AU and ASEAN’s current status quo remains 
the same, one can expect to see more of the trends identified above. 
However, the future of China’s relationship with ASEAN and the AU remains 
uncertain. Neither institutions are impervious to the potential that China amasses a greater 
level of influence. For example, ASEAN’s normative power could diminish if it continues 
to be divided by individual interests over the region’s collective well-being. Meaning, if 
China succeeds in dividing more ASEAN members, similar to Cambodia’s case, ASEAN’s 
effectiveness would suffer. Furthermore, institutional infighting would weaken ASEAN’s 
ability to push back against actors who break regional norms because it would not reach a 
consensus on regional issues. Additionally, FOCAC could continue expanding and 
solidifying bilateral arrangements, furthering China’s model of development and 
authoritarian ideals. By cementing its status as the preferred regional institution, China 
could further weaken the AU’s unity and status as a representative voice of Africa.  
Escalating security issues could also change the trajectories of ASEAN’s and the 
AU’s response to China. ASEAN member states are currently divided over SCS security 
concerns; however, a major incident involving China in the SCS could prove a catalyst for 
ASEAN members to unite against Chinese aggression. Likewise, although the AU does 
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not currently hold a foreign policy stance on China’s influence, this approach to China 
could rapidly change if debt sustainability becomes a boiling point for the region. If large 
numbers of African leaders start interpreting China’s offers as debt traps, they may become 
more risk-averse or look West for lending and infrastructure development. Since financial 
support accounts for a significant source of China’s influence in Africa, this could weaken 
China’s presence. In other words, the influence China has gained in the AU and ASEAN 
could dimmish if either institution begins perceiving China as a credible regional threat. 
  
   
 
70 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
   
 
71 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abb, Pascal, and Georg Strüver. “Regional Linkages and Global Policy Alignment: The 
Case of China-Southeast Asia Relations.” Issues and Studies; Taipei 51, no. 4 
(December 2015): 33–83.  
Abegunrin, Olayiwola and Manyeruke, Charity. China’s Power in Africa: A New Global 
Order. Cham: Springer International Publishing AG 2019.  
Acharya, Amitav. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the 
Problem of Regional Order. 2nd ed. Abingdon, Oxon;: Routledge, 2009.  
Acharya, Amitav. “Doomed by Dialogue: Will ASEAN Survive Great Power Rivalry in 
Asia?” In International Relations and Asia’s Southern Tier, 77–91. Singapore: 
Springer, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3171-7_6.  
Acharya, Amitav. “Ideas, Identity, and Institution‐building: From the ‘ASEAN Way’ to 
the ‘Asia‐Pacific Way’?” The Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (January 1, 1997): 319–46. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09512749708719226.  
Acharya, Amitav. The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013.  
Acharya, Amitav. “The Myth of ASEAN Centrality?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 39, 
no. 2 (2017): 273–79.  
Acharya, Amitav. “Why ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific Outlook Matters.” East Asia Forum, 
August 11, 2019. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/08/11/why-aseans-indo-
pacific-outlook-matters/.  
Adebayo, Bukola, and Schwarz, Tim. “China Denies Bugging African Union 
Headquarters in Ethiopia.” CNN, February 2, 2018. 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/30/africa/china-denies-spying-au-building-
intl/index.html.  
Adeniyi, Adeyemo. “African Union and the Challenges of Development.” Journal of 
African Union Studies 5, no. 2 (2016): 67–89. https://doi.org/10.2307/26893815.  
Africa Center for Strategic Studies. “Grand Strategy and China’s Soft Power Push in 
Africa.” Accessed May 12, 2020. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/grand-strategy-
and-chinas-soft-power-push-in-africa/.  
African Development Bank Group. “Africa’s Infrastructure Financing Reaches an All-
Time High in 2018, Surpassing $100 Billion.” November 12, 2019. 
https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/africas-infrastructure-
financing-reaches-all-time-high-2018-surpassing-100-billion-ica-32728.  
   
 
72 
African Union Development Agency-NEPAD. “Who We Are.” Accessed September 8, 
2020. https://www.nepad.org/who-we-are#about_us.  
African Union. “Declaration of the Ministerial Meeting of the Peace and Security 




African Union. Financial Reports Accessed January 22, 2021. https://au.int/en/financial-
reports.  
African Union. “Main Successes of the AU in Peace and Security, Challenges and 
Mitigation Measures in PlaceAfrican Union.” January 27, 2017. 
https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20170127/main-successes-au-peace-and-security-
challenges-and-mitigation-measures-place.  
African Union. “Operational Phase Of The African Continental Free Trade Area 
Launched.” Accessed September 5, 2020. https://au.int/en/articles/operational-
phase-african-continental-free-trade-area-launched.  
African Union. AU Reform. Accessed August 23, 2020. https://au.int/en/au-reform.  
Afrobarometer #VoicesAfrica Webinar on China-Africa Relations, 2020. 
https://www.facebook.com/Afrobarometer/videos/afrobarometer-voicesafrica-
webinar-on-china-africa-relations/318348352581311/.  
Akokpari, Ndinga-Muvumba. African Union and Its Institutions. Melville: Jacana Media, 
2009.  
Albert, Eleanor. “China’s Big Bet on Soft Power.” Council on Foreign Relations, 
February 9, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-big-bet-soft-power.  
Alden, Chris. “China in Africa.” Survival 47, no. 3 (October 1, 2005): 147–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330500248086.  
Alden, Alves. “History & Identity in the Construction of China’s Africa Policy.” Review 
of African Political Economy 35, no. 115 (March 1, 2008): 43–58. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/03056240802011436.  
Allison, Graham. “Destined for War: Can China and the United States Escape 
Thucydides’s Trap?” The Atlantic, September 24, 2015. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-
war-thucydides-trap/406756/.  
ASEAN. “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” June 23, 2019. https://asean.org/asean-
outlook-indo-pacific/.  
   
 
73 
Asean Regional Forum. “ASEAN Regional Forum.” Accessed December 16, 2020. 
https://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about-arf/.  
ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN Integration Report 2019. October 2019. 
https://asean.org/storage/2019/11/ASEAN-integration-report-2019.pdf  
ASEAN Secretariat. “Fact-Sheet of ASEAN Political Ssecurity Community,” November 
3, 2019. https://asean.org/storage/2012/05/40.-December-2019-Fact-Sheet-of-
APSC.pdf.  
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. “Update: Another U.S.-Built Facility at Ream 
Bites the Dust,” November 9, 2020. https://amti.csis.org/changes-underway-at-
cambodias-ream-naval-base/.  
Ba, Alice D. “Asia’s Regional Security Institutions,” in The Oxford Handbook of the 
International Relations of Asia, ed. Ravenhill Pekkanen. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199916245.013.0034.  
Ba, Alice D. “China and Asean: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-Century Asia.” Asian 
Survey 43, no. 4 (August 1, 2003): 622–47. 
https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2003.43.4.622.  
Ba, Alice D. “Who’s Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-ASEAN 
Relations.” The Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (June 1, 2006): 157–79. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740500473163.  
Basiru, Adeniyi S, and Olusesan A Osunkoya. “Between the Rock and a Hard Place: The 
Africa Union and Democracy Promotion in Africa” Journal of Governance and 
Development 16, no. 1 (2020): 49–67. 
http://jgd.uum.edu.my/images/Journal/vol.16_1/JGD_Issue1_2020_49-68.pdf  
Bayoumy, Yara. “Glitzy New AU Headquarters a Symbol of China-Africa Ties.” 
Reuters, January 29, 2012. https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-africa-china-
20120129-idAFJOE80S00K20120129.  
BBC News. “Nile Dam Dispute: Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan Agree to Resume Talks,” 
July 23, 2020. Video, 6:22. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6GzxxtpHSFI.  
BBC News. “US Labels Confucius Institute ‘Foreign Mission.’” August 14, 2020. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53773776.  
“Beijing Declaration-Toward an Even Stronger China-Africa Community with a Shared 
Future.” Accessed March 15, 2020. 
https://focacsummit.mfa.gov.cn/eng/hyqk_1/t1594324.htm.  
   
 
74 
Benabdallah, Lina, and Winslow Robertson. “Xi Jinping Pledged $60 Billion for Africa. 
Where Will the Money Go?” Washington Post, September 17, 2018. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/17/xi-jinping-
pledged-60-billion-for-africa-where-will-the-money-go/.  
Beng, Phar Kim. “ASEAN Is Failing On The South China Sea Issue.” The Diplomat, 
October 26, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/asean-is-failing-on-the-south-
china-sea-issue/.  
Bisley, Nick. “The South China Sea as Symptom of Asia’s Dynamic Security Order.” In 
US-China Competition and the South China Sea Disputes, 1st ed. 98–115. 
Routledge, 2018. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351214308-7.  
Blanchard, Ben. “China Wins Back Burkina Faso, Urges Taiwan’s Last African Ally to 
Follow.” Reuters, May 26, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-
burkina-idUSKCN1IR09W.  
Bley, Bonnie. “The New Geography of Global Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, April 16, 
2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-11-27/new-geography-
global-diplomacy.  
Breeze, Victoria, and Nathan Moore. “China Has Overtaken the U.S. and UK as the Top 
Destination for Anglophone African Students.” Quartz Africa, June 30, 2017. 
https://qz.com/africa/1017926/china-has-overtaken-the-us-and-uk-as-the-top-
destination-for-anglophone-african-students/.  
Broinowski, Alison, ed. Understanding ASEAN. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982.  
Caballero-Anthony, Mely. “The ASEAN Charter: An Opportunity Missed or One That 
Cannot Be Missed?” In Southeast Asian Affairs 2008, 71–85. Singapore: ISEAS–
Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789812307910-
007.  
Capie, David. “Structures, Shocks and Norm Change: Explaining the Late Rise of Asia’s 
Defence Diplomacy.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 35, no. 1 (2013): 1–26. 
https://doi.org/10.1355/cs35-1a.  
Carrozza, Ilaria. China’s African Union Diplomacy: Challenges and Prospects for the 
Future. London School of Economics and Political Science, Policy Brief, no 2 
(2018): 2–6, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334459613_ China’s_ 
African_Union _diplomacy_challenges_and_prospects_for_the_future  
Cheang, Sopheng. “US State Department Expresses Concern over China Link to 
Cambodian Naval Base.” Navy Times, October 7, 2020. 
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/10/07/us-state-department-
expresses-concern-over-china-link-to-cambodian-naval-base/.  
   
 
75 
Chen, Shaofeng. “Regional Responses to China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative in 
Southeast Asia.” Journal of Contemporary China 27, no. 111 (May 4,2018): 344–
361. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1410960.  
Chirisa, Mumba. “A Review of the Evolution and Trajectory of the African Union as an 
Instrument of Regional Integration.” SpringerPlus 3, no. 1 (December 2014): 1–8. 
https://doi.org/10.1186/2193-1801-3-101.  
Clarke, Frazier, and Wills. “Rountable: Non-Claimant Perspectives on the South China 
Sea Disputes.” The National Bureau of Asian Research 21 (January 2016): 188.  
Crisis Group. “The Price of Peace: Securing UN Financing for AU Peace Operations,” 
January 31, 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/286-price-peace-securing-
un-financing-au-peace-operations.  
Dahir, Abdi Latif. “Why These African Countries Are Defending China’s Mass 
Detention of Muslims.” Quartz Africa, July 15, 2019. 
https://qz.com/africa/1667141/african-leaders-defend-china-arrests-of-uyghur-
muslims-in-xinjiang/.  
Daily News Egypt. “Ethiopia Agrees with Chinese Firms to Accelerate GERD 
Construction.” March 3, 2019, https://dailynewsegypt.com/2019/03/03/ethiopia-
agrees-with-chinese-firms-to-accelerate-gerd-construction/.  
Denny, Roy. “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia; Singapore 27, no. 2 (August 2005): 305–22. 
http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1355/CS27-2G.  
Department of Defense: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China 2019. May 2, 2019. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=.  
Devonshire-Ellis, Chris. “China Set to Cash in on New African Free Trade Agreement.” 
China Briefing, May 27, 2019. https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-set-
cash-new-african-free-trade-agreement/.  
DW News. “Why Can’t Egypt and Ethiopia End the Nile Dam Dispute? “ July 16, 2020. 
Video, 10:10. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tEtKqWRlt0&feature=youtu.be.  
Einashe, Ismail. “How Mandarin Is Conquering Africa via Confucius Institutes and 
Giving China a Soft-Power Advantage.” South China Morning Post, May 16, 
2018, https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/article/2146368/how-mandarin-
conquering-africa-confucius-institutes-and-giving-china-soft.  
Emmers, Ralf. “ASEAN’s Search for Neutrality in the South China Sea.” Asian Journal 
of Peacebuilding; Seoul 2, no. 1 (May 2014): 61–77. 
https://doi.org/10.18588/201405.000019.  
   
 
76 
ESPN. “Olympics Sports Medals - 2008 Summer Olympics - Beijing, China.” Accessed 
May 7, 2020. http://www.espn.com/olympics/summer08/medals.  
FOCAC. “The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015).” Accessed September 5, 2020. 
http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/t954620.htm.  
FOCAC. “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021).” 
Accessed September 5, 2020. 
http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/t1594297.htm.  
Foot, Rosemary. “China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and 
Domestic Modes of Thought.” Asian Survey 38, no. 5 (1998): 425–40. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2645501.  
Freedom House. “Democratic Trends in Africa in Four Charts.” Accessed September 22, 
2020. https://freedomhouse.org/article/democratic-trends-africa-four-charts.  
Glosny, Michael A. “Heading toward a Win–Win Future? Recent Developments in 
China’s Policy toward Southeast Asia.” Asian Security (Philadelphia, Pa.) 2, no. 1 
(May 1, 2006): 24–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799850600575199.  
Goh, Evelyn. “ASEAN-Led Multilateralism and Regional Order: The Great Power 
Bargain Deficit.” In International Relations and Asia’s Southern Tier, 45–61. 
Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3171-
7_4.  
Goh, Evelyn. “Modes of China’s Influence: Cases from Southeast Asia.” Asian Survey 
54, no. 5 (2014): 825–48. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2014.54.5.825.  
Goh, Evelyn. Rising China’s Influence in Developing Asia. Oxford: University Press, 
2016.  
Gowan, Richard. “China’s Pragmatic Approach to UN Peacekeeping.” Brookings , 
September 14, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-pragmatic-
approach-to-un-peacekeeping/.  
Ha, Hoang Thi. “Pitfalls for ASEAN in Negotiating a Code of Conduct in the South 
China Sea,” Yusof Ishak Institute no. 57 (July 23,2019):1-8.  
Ha, Hoang Thi. “Understanding China’s Proposal for an ASEAN-China Community of 
Common Destiny and ASEAN’s Ambivalent Response.” Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 41, no. 2 (2019): 223–54. https://doi.org/10.2307/26798853.  
Haacke, Jürgen. “The ASEAN Regional Forum: From Dialogue to Practical Security 
Cooperation?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22, no. 3 (September 1, 
2009): 427–49. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570903104057.  
   
 
77 
Haggard, Stephan. “The Liberal View of the International Relations of Asia.” In The 
Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia, Vol 1. Oxford University 
Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199916245.013.0003.  
Hansrod, Zeenat. “African Union Wants to Reduce Dependency on Foreign Donors.” 
RFI, November 11, 2018, https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20181119-african-union-
wants-reduce-dependency-foreign-donors.  
Harneit-Sievers, Axel, Stephen Marks, and Sanusha Naidu. Chinese and African 
Perspectives on China in Africa. Capetown: Pambazuka Press, Pambazuka, 2010.  
Hartig, Falk. “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China.” Journal of Chinese Political 
Science; Dordrecht 17, no. 1 (March 2012): 53–76. 
http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1007/s11366-011-9178-7.  
He, Kai. “Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic 
Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia.” European 
Journal of International Relations 14, no. 3 (September 1, 2008): 489–518. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066108092310.  
Eisenman, Heginbotham. China Steps Out: Beijing’s Major Power Engagement with the 
Developing World. China Steps Out. 1st ed. Florence: Routledge, 2018. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315472652.  
Heip, Le Hong. “Can ASEAN Overcome the ‘Consensus Dilemma’ over the South China 
Sea?,” Yusof Ishak Institute, no. 58 (2016): 8.  
Hopf, Ted. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.” 
International Security 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–200. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2539267.  
Hutt, David. “How China Came to Dominate Cambodia.” The Diplomat, September 1, 
2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/how-china-came-to-dominate-cambodia/.  
International Federation of Journalists. The China Story: Reshaping the World’s Media, 
June 23, 2020. https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/reports/detail/ifj-report-the-
china-story-reshaping-the-worlds-media/category/publications.html.  
Ikenberry, G. John. “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive.” Ethics & International 
Affairs; New York 32, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 17–29. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0892679418000072.  
Ikenberry, G John, and Darren J Lim. “China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft.” 
Brookings, April 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/chinas-emerging-institutional-statecraft.pdf.  
   
 
78 
Inboden, Rana Siu, and Titus C. Chen. “China’s Response to International Normative 
Pressure: The Case of Human Rights.” The International Spectator 47, no. 2 
(June 1, 2012): 45–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2012.683277.  
ISS Africa. “Lessons from Sri Lanka on China’s ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy,’” February 21, 
2018. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lessons-from-sri-lanka-on-chinas-debt-trap-
diplomacy.  
Izzuddin, Ian Mustafa Storey, ed. “Roundtable: ASEAN at Fifty and Beyond.” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia; Singapore 39, no. 2 (August 2017): 229–31. 
http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1355/cs39-2a.  
Jones, David Martin, and Michael L. R. Smith. “Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN 
and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order.” International Security 32, no. 1 
(2007): 148–84.  
Kagame, His Excellency Paul. “Unleashing Africa’s Inner Strengths.” Brookings, 
January 11, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/research/unleashing-africas-inner-
strengths/.  
Kalu, Kenneth. “‘Respect’ and ‘Agency’ as Driving Forces for China–Africa Relations.” 
Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, August 10, 2020. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-020-00178-z.  
Keohane, Robert O. “The Value of Institutions and the Costs of Flexibility.” In After 
Hegemony, 243–59. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. 
Princeton University Press, 1984. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt7sq9s.14.  
Kliman, Daniel. Addressing China’s Influence in Southeast Asia: America’s Approach 
and the Role of Congress. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). 
Accessed May 26, 2020. https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-
testimony/addressing-chinas-influence-in-southeast-asia-americas-approach-and-
the-role-of-congress.  
Kovrig, Michael. “China Expands Its Peace and Security Footprint in Africa.” 
International Crisis Group, October 24, 2018. 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/china-expands-its-peace-
and-security-footprint-africa.  
Kuik, Cheng-Chwee. “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States’ 
Alignment Behavior towards China.” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100 
(July 3, 2016): 500–514. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1132714.  
Kuo, Lily. “China Is Training Africa’s next Generation of Transport and Aviation 
Experts.” Quartz Africa. Accessed May 12, 2020. 
https://qz.com/africa/1030978/china-is-training-africas-next-generation-of-
aviation-and-transport-officials/.  
   
 
79 
Kurlantzick, Joshua. Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the 
World. New Haven, United States: Yale University Press, 2007.  
Lall, Ashish. Facets Of Competitiveness: Narratives From Asean. Singapore: World 
Scientific Publishing Company, 2011.  
Landale, James. “China’s New Brand of Tough-Talking Diplomats.” BBC News, May 13, 
2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-52562549.  
Lee, Yoong Yoong, and Catherine Lim. Asean Matters! Reflecting On The Association 
Of Southeast Asian Nations. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 
2011.  
Leke, Acha. “Reforming the African Union: The Vital Challenge of Implementation.” 
Brookings Institute, May 3, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-
focus/2017/05/03/reforming-the-african-union-the-vital-challenge-of-
implementation/.  
Lhasa, Minggu. “Eminent Persons Group Chief ‘Proud’ of ASEAN Charter - Malaysian 
Agency.” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, November 21, 2007.  
Lim, Louisa, and Julia Bergin. “Inside China’s Audacious Global Propaganda 
Campaign.” The Guardian, December 7, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-
dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping.  
Lim, Yves-Heng. “How (Dis)Satisfied Is China? A Power Transition Theory 
Perspective.” Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 92 (March 4, 2015): 280–
97. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.932160.  
Mahbubani, Kishore, and Jeffery Sng. “ASEAN:: Strengths and Weaknesses.” In The 
ASEAN Miracle, 177–206. A Catalyst for Peace. NUS Press, 2017. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1xz0m3.11.  
Maizland, Lindsey. “Is China Undermining Human Rights at the United Nations?” 
Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed May 5, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/in-
brief/china-undermining-human-rights-united-nations.  
Makinda, Samuel M., F. Wafula Okumu, and F. Wafula Okumu. The African Union: 
Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance. Routledge, 2007. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203940112.  
Mangu, André Mbata. “The African Union and the Promotion of Democracy and Good 
Political Governance under the African Peer-Review Mechanism: 10 Years On.” 
Africa Review 6, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 59–72. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09744053.2014.883757.  
   
 
80 
Marais, Hannah, and Jean-Pierre Labuschagne. “China’s Role in African Infrastructure 
and Capital Projects.” Deloitte Insights, March 22, 2019. 
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/public-sector/china-investment-
africa-infrastructure-development.html.  
Marks, Simon. “Coronavirus Ends China’s Honeymoon in Africa.” Politico, April 16, 
2020. https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/16/coronavirus-china-africa-
191444.  
Mastro, Oriana Skylar. “China’s Military Modernization Program.” American Enterprise 
Institute, September 4, 2019, 16.  
Mbaku, John Mukum. “The Controversy over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.” 
Brookings Institute, August 5, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-
focus/2020/08/05/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/.  
McGann, James. 2020 Africa Think Tank Summit. TTCSP Global and Regional Think 
Tank Summit Reports, January 1, 2020. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/ttcsp_summitreports/46.  
Mearsheimer, John J. “China’s Unpeaceful Rise.” Current History (1941) 105, no 690 
(April 1, 2006): 160–62. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2006.105.690.160  
Meidan, Michal. “China’s Africa Policy: Business Now, Politics Later.” Asian 
Perspective 30, no. 4 (2006): 69–93.  
Melissen, Jan, ed. The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230554931.  
Nagar, Dawn, and Fritz Nganje. “The African Union: Regional and Global Challenges.” 
Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2016. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05128.  
Nagar, Dawn, and Fritz Nganje. “The AU’s Peace and Security Architecture.” The 
African Union: Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2016.. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05178.9.  
Ng’amjo, Mwanja. “Update on the African Integrated High-Speed Railway Network.” 
African Union Development Agency-NEPAD, July 31, 2020. 
https://nepad.org/content/update-african-integrated-high-speed-railway-network-
auda-nepad.  
Nguyen, Khanh Vu, Phuong. “Asia Forms World’s Biggest Trade Bloc, a China-Backed 
Group Excluding U.S.” Reuters, November 15, 2020. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/asean-trade-summit-rcep-signing-
idUSKBN27V03K.  
   
 
81 
Nishimura, H., M. Ambashi, and F. Iwasaki. “Strengthened ASEAN Centrality and East 
Asia Collective Leadership: Role of Japan-ASEAN Cooperation as Development 
of Heart-to-Heart Diplomacy.” Edited by Simon Tay, Shiro Armstrong, Peter 
Drysdale, and Ponciano S Intal. Economic Reserach Institute for ASEAN and East 
Asia (ERIA) II, no. Collective Leadership, ASEAN Centrality, and Strengthening 
the ASEAN Institutional Ecosystem (May 2019): 20.  
Nwebo, Osy Ezechukwunyere. “The African Union Agenda 2063 and the Imperative of 
Democratic Governance.” Law and Development Review; Berlin 11, no. 2 (2018): 
259–76. http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1515/ldr-2018-0019.  
Nye, Joseph. Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics. New York: Public 
Affairs, 2009.  
Nye, Joseph S., and Wang Jisi. “Hard Decisions on Soft Power: Opportunities and 
Difficulties for Chinese Soft Power.” Harvard International Review 31, no. 2 
(2009): 18–22.  
Ojha, Abhiruchi. “China and Africa: Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the 
Continent.” Africa Review 11, no. 2 (July 3, 2019): 208–10. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09744053.2019.1634974.  
Okeke, Charles. “AfCFTA an Opportunity to Expand China-Africa Ties - Global Times.” 
Global Times, September 11, 2019. 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1164317.shtml.  
Packer, Corinne A. A., and Donald Rukare. “The New African Union and Its Constitutive 
Act.” The American Journal of International Law 96, no. 2 (2002): 365–79. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2693932.  
Parameswaran, Prashanth. “Assessing ASEAN’s South China Sea Position in Its Post-
Ruling Statement.” The Diplomat, July 25, 2016. 
https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/assessing-aseans-south-china-sea-position-in-its-
post-ruling-statement/.  
Parameswaran, Prashanth. “Cambodia Wants China Warships: Navy Commander.” The 
Diplomat. Accessed November 30, 2020. 
https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/cambodia-wants-china-warships-navy-
commander/.  
Park, Yoon. “One Million Chinese in Africa.” SAIS Perspectives, May 12, 2016. 
http://www.saisperspectives.com/2016issue/2016/5/12/n947s9csa0ik6kmkm0bzb
0hy584sfo.  
Paterson, Mark, and Abebajo Adekeye. “The African Union at Ten: Aspirations and 
Reality.” Centre for Conflict Resolution (2012), 1–6. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05127.  
   
 
82 
Patey, Luke. The New Kings of Crude: China, India, and the Global Struggle for Oil in 
Sudan and South Sudan. London: C. Hurst and Company (Publishers) Limited, 
2014.  
Pharatlhatlhe, Kesa, and Jan Vanheukelom. Financing the African Union on Mindsets 
and Money. Discussion Paper No. 240. Politcal Economy Dynamics of Regional 
Organizations in Africa, February 2019. https://ecdpm.org/wp-
content/uploads/DP240-Financing-the-African-Union-on-mindsets-and-
money.pdf.  
Plummer, Peter A. Petri and Michael. “RCEP: A New Trade Agreement That Will Shape 
Global Economics and Politics.” Brookings , November 16, 2020. 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/16/rcep-a-new-trade-
agreement-that-will-shape-global-economics-and-politics/.  
Putz, Catherine. “Which Countries Are For or Against China’s Xinjiang Policies?” The 
Diplomat, July 15, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/which-countries-are-
for-or-against-chinas-xinjiang-policies/.  
Reuters. “African Union Delays Plan to Start Using Fund for Security Operations.” 
February 11, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africanunion-summit-
idUSKBN2050D9.  
Roberts, Christopher B. ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and 
Institutionalisation. London: Routledge, 2012.  
Robertson, Peter E., and Adrian Sin. “Measuring Hard Power: China’s Economic Growth 
and Military Capacity.” Defence and Peace Economics 28, no. 1 (January 2, 
2017): 91–111. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2015.1033895.  
Rogers, Philippe D. “China and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa.” 
Naval War College Review; Washington 60, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 73–93.  
Rolland, Nadege. China’s Vision for a New World Order. The National Bureau of Asian 
Research, January 2020. https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-vision-for-a-
new-world-order/.  
Rudd, Kevin. Are China and the U.S. Doomed to Conflict? Produced by TED. April 1, 
2015. Video, 20:06. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XQ1onjXJK0.  
Ryder, Hannah. “What the UK Can Learn from China about Running an Africa Summit.” 
Quartz Africa, January 19, 2020. https://qz.com/africa/1787779/what-the-uk-
africa-summit-can-learn-from-china/.  
   
 
83 
Sato, Koichi. “The Rise of China’s Impact on ASEAN Conference Diplomacy: A Study 
of Conflict in the South China Sea.” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 
2, no. 2 (January 2013): 95–110. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2013.11869064.  
Schreer, Benjamin. “China’s Development of a More Secure Nuclear Second-Strike 
Capability: Implications for Chinese Behavior and U.S. Extended Deterrence.” 
Asia Policy 19, no. 1 (February 4, 2015): 14–20. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2015.0010.  
Shaban, Abdur. “China Donates $1.2m to AU Mission in Somalia.” Africa News, 
November 28, 2016. https://www.africanews.com/2016/11/28/china-donates-
12m-to-au-mission-in-somalia/.  
Shambaugh, David L. China Goes Global: The Partial Power. Oxford ; Oxford 
University Press, 2013.  
Shinn, David. China’s Strategic Aims in Africa. US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, May 8, 2020. https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/chinas-
strategic-aims-africa.  
Shinn, David, and Joshua Eisenman. China and Africa: A Century of Engagement. 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt3fhwkz.  
Shinn, David H. “Ethiopia and China: Two Former Empires Connect in the 20th 
Century.” International Journal of Ethiopian Studies 8, no. 1 & 2 (2014): 149–64. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/26554822.  
Shullman, David. “Protect the Party: China’s Growing Influence in the Developing 
World.” Brookings, January 22, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/protect-
the-party-chinas-growing-influence-in-the-developing-world/.  
Sipalan, Joseph, and Khanh Vu. “Malaysia Says Vietnamese Fisherman Killed in Clash 
with Coast Guard.” Reuters, August 17, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
malaysia-vietnam-shooting-idUSKCN25D0R6.  
Smith, Elliot. “The US-China Trade Rivalry Is Underway in Africa, and Washington Is 
Playing Catch-Up.” CNBC, October 9, 2019, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/09/the-us-china-trade-rivalry-is-underway-in-
africa.html.  
Sohn, Injoo. “After Renaissance: China’s Multilateral Offensive in the Developing 
World.” European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 
77–101. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066110392083.  
   
 
84 
Soulé, Folashadé. “‘Africa+1’ Summit Diplomacy and the ‘New Scramble’ Narrative: 
Recentering African Agency.” African Affairs (London), June 4, 2020. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adaa015.  
Sow, Mariama. “Figure of the Week: The African Union Introduces a New Funding 
Structure.” Brookings, July 27, 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-
focus/2016/07/27/figure-of-the-week-the-african-union-introduces-a-new-
funding-structure/.  
Stimson Center. “Chinese Campaigns for Political Influence in Africa,” May 13, 2020. 
https://www.stimson.org/2020/chinese-campaigns-for-political-influence-in-
africa/.  
Storey, Ian. “Assessing the ASEAN-China Framework for the Code of Conduct for the 
South China Sea.” Yusof Ishak Institute, no. 62 (August 9, 2017): 1–7.  
Sun, Xuefeng. “The Efficiency of China’s Multilateral Policies in East Asia (1997–
2007).” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 10, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 
515–41. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcq011.  
Tadros, Amjad. “Ethiopia Filling Mega-Dam That Egypt Calls an ‘Existential’ Threat.” 
CBS News, July 17, 2019. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ethiopia-nile-dam-
filling-reservoir-egypt-calls-existential-threat-in-3-way-dispute-sudan/.  
Taylor, Ian. The Forum on China- Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). London, United 
Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2011.  
Thayer, Carlyle A. “ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.” 
SAIS Review of International Affairs 33, no. 2 (2013): 75–84.  
Tiezzi, Shannon. “If China Bugged the AU Headquarters, What African Countries 
Should Be Worried?,” January 31, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/if-
china-bugged-the-au-headquarters-what-african-countries-should-be-worried/.  
Tongwaranan, Tanyatorn. “Inequality a Growing Challenge for Rising Asean.” Bangkok 
Post, April 30, 2018. https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/1455114/inequality-
a-growing-challenge-for-rising-asean.  
Ukeje, Charles, and Yonas Tariku. “Beyond Symbolism: China and the African Union in 
African Peace and Security.” In China and Africa: Building Peace and Security 
Cooperation on the Continent, edited by Chris Alden, Abiodun Alao, Zhang 
Chun, and Laura Barber, 289–309. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 
2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52893-9_15.  
U.S. Department of State. “Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).” Accessed 
November 22, 2020. https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/regional/asean//index.htm.  
   
 
85 
U.S. Congress. Senate. China’s Strategic Aims in Africa: Hearing before the US-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 116 Cong., 2nd sess., May 8, 2020, 
https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/chinas-strategic-aims-africa.Vietnam. 
“Chairman’s Statement of the 23rd ASEAN-CHINA Summit,” November 12, 
2020, 7.  
Walt, Stephen M. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” International 
Security 9, no. 4 (1985): 3–43. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540.  
Wanandi, Jusuf. “ASEAN’s China Strategy: Towards Deeper Engagement.” Survival 38, 
no. 3 (September 1, 1996): 117–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339608442867.  
Williams, Paul D. “The African Union’s Conflict Management Capabilities.” Council on 
Foreign Relations, October 2011, 32.  
Woon, Walter. The ASEAN Charter: A Commentary. Reprint edition. Singapore: National 
University of Singapore Press, 2015.  
Woon, Walter. “The ASEAN Charter Ten Years On.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 39, 
no. 2 (2017): 245–51.  
World Bank. “The African Continental Free Trade Area.” Accessed September 17, 2020. 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/trade/publication/the-african-continental-
free-trade-area.  
Xinhuan News. “More than 2,600 Journalists Register to Cover FOCAC Summit.” 
Accessed September 24, 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-
09/03/c_137441625.htm.  
Yeo, Andrew. Asia’s Regional Architecture: Alliances and Institutions in the Pacific 
Century. Studies in Asian Security. Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 2019.  
Zhang, Zhexin. “China’s International Strategy and Its Implications for Southeast Asia.” 
Southeast Asian Affairs, 2016, 55–66.  
Zhexin, Zhang. “China’s International Strategy and Its Implications for Southeast Asia.” 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2016, no. 1 (August 3, 2016): 55–66.  
Zhou, Yuan, and Zhang Zhihao. “China Boosts Soft Power by Training Foreign 
Journalists.” China Daily, October 17, 2016. 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-10/17/content_27077588.htm.  
Zsombor, Peter. “New US-ASEAN Naval Drills a ‘Balancing Act’ with Beijing | Voice 
of America - English.” VOA News, August 28, 2019. 
https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/new-us-asean-naval-drills-balancing-
act-beijing. 
   
 
86 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
   
 
87 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
